During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing prior to the congressional recess, Sen. Mark Kelly (D-AZ) questioned General Bryan P. Fenton, the Commander of the United States Special Operations Command, about proposed budget cuts for the command.
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00:00Thank you, Ranking Member. We'll recognize now Senator Kelly for five
00:05minutes of questions. Thank you, Madam Chair. General Fenton, in your opening
00:08statement you highlighted your flat budget since 2019, which appears to be a
00:1514 percent decrease in purchasing power, and SOCOM has also faced some significant
00:21personnel cuts over the past years. Is it fair to say right now that the demand
00:26for special operations forces continues to increase? Is that a fair observation?
00:31Senator, that's absolutely a fair characterization, as I've laid out in the
00:36opening statement. And so where, with this flat budget, then where have you
00:41assumed any additional risk because of budgetary and personnel constraints?
00:49Senator, I'd actually offer two places. In the operational arena, we've
00:56assumed risk in deterrence. As I mentioned in the opening statement, I'll assume no
01:00risk in crisis response today. That is a sacred obligation. And as we go across
01:06the spectrum in deterrence, as I've laid out, there have been instances where I've
01:10had to say no to combatant commander requirements because of operational risk
01:15and fiscal constraints in a way I haven't seen before. So first in operations,
01:19deterrence. Second is in modernization. Working to have the SOCOM team, and at
01:27times tying it to the joint force for sure, be able to win in the future
01:31environment like we have won for years and years and years in an increasingly
01:35contested and congested environment. We're taking risks there. The inability to
01:40get after the things I think that are asymmetric, that are part of the changing
01:44character of war. Do it at speed. You could add anything uncrewed, artificial
01:48intelligence, additive manufacturing autonomy. All that I think we're accruing
01:53high risk because we as SOCOM are not able to get after that based on a flat top
01:57line. On five years, one billion dollars in lost buying power that is reflective of
02:03that 14% lost buying power. Would it be fair for me to say then that a risk in
02:09deterrence because of the, if you're not deterring our adversaries, there's a higher
02:16chance you're going to have to put some of your troops in harm's way, that the
02:20risk to your forces personally, risk to them being injured or killed in combat, that
02:27that has gone up. And I think it's probably fair to say the same thing on the
02:31modernization side of this. If you're using, if you don't have the equipment you
02:38need and you're facing a more challenging adversary, that that's possibly putting
02:45folks at risk as well? Senator, I'll take it from the modernization piece first. I
02:51think first and foremost, the risk is not winning, not being able to complete the
02:57mission in the future environment. Again, against the backdrop of what we're seeing
03:01in Ukraine with the changing character of war that has, I call it a version of
03:06symmetry and asymmetry. Symmetry being all the things, and certainly the Russian
03:10Federation had, that any nation needs to go to war, tanks and missiles and
03:15airplanes and helicopters. And then asymmetry, where Ukraine did not have that and
03:22has imposed costs on the Russian Federation through all things that we're
03:26observing, institutionalizing and operationalizing. I think we're taking
03:29risks there and that risk is about winning. It certainly has a force protection
03:33component to it, because if you're unable to get through the contested and
03:38congested battle space of integrated air missile defense, radio frequency
03:42spectrums, knocking your things down, electronic warfare, there is a force
03:46protection component for sure to that. And I look at both, but I think it's a, it's a,
03:50it's both of those in modernization. In deterrence, I think it's more about
03:54aggregated risk. Us not being able to fulfill the parts of a campaign plan or no plan, that the
04:01combatant commanders absolutely would rely on. And that probably at some point has
04:05aggregated risk for, for his end states and certainly their operations.
04:11Right. Thank you. Thank you, General. And Mr. Jenkins, on China gray zone operations,
04:18they, they execute this all the time as an instrument of national power and in their
04:25effort to supplant us as the world's preeminent superpower. So what adjustments in just quickly
04:32in a statute or fiscal authorities, would you need to better compete and deter the PRC?
04:39In terms of authorities, we, we, we are working sufficiently and efficiently with, with what we
04:45have right now. It comes down to what, what the general outlined in terms of resources. We clearly
04:51recognize that deterring China is not just in the South China Sea, the first island chain,
04:56it's everywhere. And in the closed session, we'll be able to give you some good vignettes on where
04:59we are going head to head to detour in the irregular warfare arena to make sure that we not only meet
05:06China where they are, but where they want to be, where they, where they're trying to be. And so in
05:10terms of authorities, we're, we're moving out and executing on what we have, but we're always
05:14looking to, to evolve with them as well. All right. If you identify something, please come to us with that.
05:19Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Senator Kelly. And now I record