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Sen. James Risch (R-ID) leads a Senate Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on allies in the Indo-Pacific.

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Transcript
00:00:00Thank you all for attending today, and we apologize we're starting a little late.
00:00:05We had an important meeting before us and trying to get a handle on some things that
00:00:10are going on.
00:00:12I'm going to give the usual statement.
00:00:14We welcome all of you here.
00:00:17This is a public hearing.
00:00:19We're doing the business of the United States of America, and this is just as important
00:00:24as a courtroom.
00:00:25As a result of that, there'll be no audience participation.
00:00:29Audience participation includes anything that attempts to communicate with either witnesses
00:00:36or the committee.
00:00:37Whether you're standing up, whether you're talking, whether you're protesting, whether
00:00:40you're holding up signs, none of that is permitted here.
00:00:43We have zero tolerance for it.
00:00:45If you do that, you're going to be arrested immediately, as the people yesterday did that,
00:00:50were arrested, and then after you're arrested and go through the process, you will be banned
00:00:56from the committee for a year.
00:01:00With that, again, we welcome your participation here as a spectator, but that's the limit
00:01:09of what you can do here.
00:01:12With that, we have an important hearing this morning on Indo-Pacific alliances, and we
00:01:18have some good and important witnesses for that.
00:01:21I'm going to make an opening statement, and then I will recognize the ranking member to
00:01:27make an opening statement, and then we will hear from our witnesses, and then we will
00:01:32open it up to a round of questions.
00:01:35With that, as an opening statement, I'd like to talk about this issue.
00:01:40Over the past several years, we have seen China rapidly escalate its aggressive actions
00:01:44against Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and other countries in the Indo-Pacific.
00:01:51China has positioned itself as America's most significant long-term challenge, and
00:01:59that means in the short term, China's military aggression in the Indo-Pacific should not
00:02:04go unchecked.
00:02:06China's actions destabilize global security and disrupt global trade, which could impact
00:02:14Americans' financial aspects.
00:02:19And as demonstrated by China's spy balloon, which invaded our sovereign airspace in 2023,
00:02:25China's ambitions aren't confined to Asia.
00:02:29China's military is rapidly modernizing its shipbuilding capacity, which is formidable,
00:02:35and its development of dual-use artificial intelligence is growing more advanced by the
00:02:40day.
00:02:41In this dangerous security environment, we and our allies need to help ourselves by increasing
00:02:46defense spending and building joint capabilities.
00:02:51China's aggression should be confronted, but America should not be the world's only watchdog.
00:02:57To counter Chinese aggression, we need our allies to work with us to ensure each of us
00:03:03is strong and capable of pushing back.
00:03:06This hearing will focus on how we can build alliances that are fit and up to this task.
00:03:13America is well-positioned because we have a Commander-in-Chief who understands the need
00:03:17for a strong relationship with our Indo-Pacific allies.
00:03:21President Trump's recent successful summit with the Japanese Prime Minister and his administration's
00:03:26early focus on the Philippines are proof of this.
00:03:30In his first term, President Trump deepened security cooperation with Taiwan, kept U.S.-Japan-South
00:03:36Korea intelligence-sharing initiative alive, and approved major arms transfers to Southeast
00:03:42Asian partners.
00:03:44We need to build on this work.
00:03:45Key to this is encouraging responsible and effective burden-sharing from our partners.
00:03:50This has been a decades-long bipartisan initiative that has only become more pressing.
00:03:56South Korea has done great work here.
00:03:58Its defense spending grew consistently during the Cold War and beyond, always remaining
00:04:02well above 2 percent of its GDP.
00:04:05It now boasts a robust defense industry and is well-positioned to work with the U.S. on
00:04:09boosting our shipbuilding capacity.
00:04:12Japan's defense spending remains comparably low, but it is taking important steps, like
00:04:20acquiring counter-strike capabilities.
00:04:22And in Taiwan, double-digit defense spending increases must continue, given the threat
00:04:28it faces across the Taiwan Strait.
00:04:30In addition to sharing the burden of defense, our allies need to expand U.S. basing and
00:04:35overflight access around the Indo-Pacific.
00:04:37The best way to show China that we stand together is if we are physically present in the region.
00:04:43The Philippines has shown itself to be a great partner in this regard since the signing of
00:04:47the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement.
00:04:51We need far more of this around the region.
00:04:53I look forward to hearing the witnesses' thoughts on how to approach both burden sharing
00:04:58and access, basing and overflight in Asia, and more specifically, what role the State
00:05:03Department should play on these issues.
00:05:08The issue in military aggression, the rise in military aggression from China is a threat
00:05:13to us all.
00:05:15If we do not use our alliances in the Indo-Pacific to a high standard, we do Americans and the
00:05:23people of the region a tremendous disservice.
00:05:26With that, thank you to the witnesses for being here today.
00:05:29We have a good panel.
00:05:30We're looking forward to hearing from them.
00:05:33With that, I'll recognize the ranking member.
00:05:36Thank you, Chairman Risch.
00:05:37Welcome to our witnesses.
00:05:38We so appreciate your being here this morning.
00:05:41From the South China Sea, where China's Coast Guard harasses Philippine forces, to Beijing's
00:05:47military exercises over the Taiwan Strait, there is bipartisan agreement that these aggressive
00:05:52actions threaten national security.
00:05:56But as we know, the impacts of China's rise are not isolated to Asia.
00:06:01Debt-trapped diplomacy with infrastructure projects in Africa, the flow of fentanyl precursor
00:06:06chemicals into Latin America, economic coercion in Europe over Lithuania's support for Taiwan,
00:06:13China's influence can be felt across the globe.
00:06:16That's certainly the case in Ukraine, where China and North Korea have been actively supporting
00:06:21Putin's war machine.
00:06:23Beijing is watching how we respond to Ukraine as it weighs its options in Taiwan.
00:06:29The presidents of both parties have recognized the challenge that China poses.
00:06:34President Trump took important steps by implementing export controls during his first term.
00:06:40President Biden not only kept those controls in place, his administration strengthened
00:06:44them.
00:06:45Our allies in Asia, as the chairman pointed out, also recognize the threat that China
00:06:50poses.
00:06:51In 2022, Japan committed to increasing its defense spending.
00:06:56Australia has made historic investments in AUKUS, our trilateral defense partnership
00:07:01with the UK, and Taiwan is boosting its defense budget to over 3 percent of its GDP.
00:07:08I agree that American allies should pay their fair share of defense spending, but we should
00:07:13also acknowledge that our Indo-Pacific partners are stepping up.
00:07:17And U.S. support for these alliances isn't charity, it's a strategic investment.
00:07:23America's alliances around the world are one of our greatest security assets.
00:07:28South Korea hosts eight U.S. military bases and 23,000 U.S. service members.
00:07:34Japan not only allows the U.S. to station 55,000 troops across 15 major bases, it also
00:07:42helps pay for them, contributing $2 billion a year.
00:07:46These partnerships are mutually beneficial and go beyond our military.
00:07:50Whether in Europe or Latin America, our allies help us to counter China's economic influence
00:07:55and disinformation.
00:07:57The combined power of American and European markets together expands our ability to set
00:08:02AI standards, and our alliances support American companies and workers.
00:08:08Last week, I attended a defense industry roundtable on AUKUS in New Hampshire.
00:08:14Strengthening our submarine industrial base, like the work being done at the Portsmouth
00:08:18Naval Shipyard, does more than give us a strategic edge over China.
00:08:23It creates high-quality American jobs, and it supports our domestic industry.
00:08:28So instead of threatening or undermining friendly nations with tariffs, I think we should be
00:08:33strengthening our alliances.
00:08:35NATO has contained the Soviet Union and Russia for decades.
00:08:40I'd be interested in hearing from our witnesses on what mutual defense arrangements for the
00:08:44Indo-Pacific might look like.
00:08:47We need to explore every advantage that we have.
00:08:50Indo-PACOM, our military command in the region, has also led the way in implementing the Women,
00:08:55Peace, and Security Act.
00:08:57The commander recently told me that Indo-PACOM has been more effective than any other U.S.
00:09:03international command in ensuring women play key roles in decision-making.
00:09:08That's a strategic strength, and we should build on it if we want to combat the growing
00:09:13link between security in Asia and security in Europe.
00:09:17As we know, the world is more connected than ever.
00:09:20I hope our witnesses this morning will speak not only to the challenges we face, but also
00:09:25to the opportunities that we can seize at this historic time.
00:09:29So I look forward to hearing your thoughts, and I'm delighted that you're joining us.
00:09:36Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
00:09:37We'll now hear from our witnesses.
00:09:39We're going to start with Randall Shriver, Chairman of the Board at the Project 2049
00:09:45Institute.
00:09:46He previously served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs
00:09:50in the first Trump administration, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian
00:09:56and Pacific Affairs.
00:09:57He is one of our foremost experts on U.S. alliances in Asia.
00:10:02The floor is yours.
00:10:05Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Shaheen, and other distinguished members of the committee.
00:10:09I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning to testify on this topic.
00:10:13So for the United States to realize our goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific, we are and
00:10:18will continue to be very heavily reliant on alliances and partnerships.
00:10:23We're a Pacific power, but we're not heavily resident in the Western Pacific.
00:10:29Hawaii is three time zones away from the continental U.S., but still east of the international
00:10:36dateline, and even our great territories, Guam, our state of Alaska, do not put us resident
00:10:43enough in the Western Pacific to fully affect security the way we would like.
00:10:48This geographic conundrum advantages our adversaries and competitors for China, Russia, North Korea.
00:10:55They enjoy geographic proximity to the areas we seek to safeguard.
00:10:59So this means in a contingency, whether that be Taiwan Strait, West Philippine Sea, East
00:11:04China Sea, the United States will always be the away team, will always be playing on the
00:11:09road.
00:11:10Strong alliances and partnerships are the best way to combat this tyranny of time and
00:11:15distance.
00:11:16In the military and security domain, we rely on our allies and partnerships for at least
00:11:20three types of contributions.
00:11:22First, we need them to develop their own capabilities for their sufficient self-defense, but also
00:11:28to be contributors to other regional contingencies if need be.
00:11:32Second, we rely on them for access, basing, and overflight, as has been pointed out in
00:11:37the opening statements, as a distant power ourselves.
00:11:42And third, we rely on our partners and allies to also play a role in the shaping and the
00:11:46support for a free and open Indo-Pacific and all that that entails, as well as day-to-day
00:11:52activities that uphold deterrence.
00:11:56So these are the things that I think are the basis for evaluating burden sharing.
00:12:00I think too often burden sharing is scoped down to a single figure, which is how much
00:12:06is a country spending per GDP, percentage of GDP on defense.
00:12:10I think that doesn't always tell the whole story.
00:12:12It's revealing, but doesn't always tell the whole story.
00:12:15And just a few examples, Philippines spends 1.5 percent of GDP on defense, but yet they're
00:12:21making more and more sites available for U.S. forces through, as the chairman mentioned,
00:12:26the ECTA agreements, nine sites now.
00:12:29Japan, as was mentioned, has historically spent close to 1 percent of GDP, but in fact,
00:12:37we were advocates for actively suppressing that defense spending for many decades to
00:12:42now get to a point where people would like to see them do more.
00:12:45They are doing more, but they are also the host to the largest number of U.S. military
00:12:49forces forward deployed, and as ranking member Shaheen pointed out, they are contributors
00:12:55through host nation support.
00:12:57Taiwan is spending 2.5 percent of GDP, but they're also spending a lot that is not accounted
00:13:02for in defense when it comes to national resiliency on energy, on communications, on civil defense.
00:13:09So perhaps they should be getting more credit.
00:13:13History is very important too.
00:13:14We have partners and allies that have fought alongside us in every conflict since World
00:13:18War I, and of course I'm speaking most directly about Australia.
00:13:22So I believe it's a complicated formula, and we should take a comprehensive view on burden
00:13:27sharing and give credit where credit is due, because these alliances are so important to
00:13:31us.
00:13:32This is further complicated by the changing nature of the threat.
00:13:35Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles put our forward deployed forces at risk, so we're
00:13:40now more and more dependent on our allies for basing and access.
00:13:46So spending figures do not capture the entire picture in my point of view.
00:13:54Our State Department will be extraordinarily important in addressing this.
00:13:58Our State Department, they're the lead negotiators for host nation support, for access.
00:14:03They run our security assistance, foreign military sales, foreign military financing,
00:14:09international military education and training.
00:14:11They run programs that are adjacent to military and security, like the INL programs that support
00:14:16Coast Guards through the prism of law enforcement.
00:14:19And I would argue even the education and cultural programs, the Fulbright, the International
00:14:22Visitors Program, that's investing in the alliance managers of the future, and I think
00:14:27that should be supported.
00:14:29Let me close with four brief recommendations that address issues under the purview of this
00:14:35committee.
00:14:36I think, number one, that this committee should ask for regular updates regarding our more
00:14:39advanced and mature alliances, Japan and Australia, to make sure initiatives are on track with
00:14:45respect to posture and C2 adjustments and both pillars of AUKUS.
00:14:50Two, I think the committee should insist State Department demonstrate FMS, FMF and IMET are,
00:14:55in fact, in alignment with our strategic goals and should be actively shaping that.
00:15:00Third, I think the committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of U.S. assistance
00:15:05reviews and direct resumption of aid that aligns with our strategic priorities, things
00:15:10like ECTA and Coast Guard support and dioxin remediation in Vietnam.
00:15:15And finally, this committee should insist on a speedy conclusion of State Department
00:15:18review of education and cultural programs and direct resumption of programs that align
00:15:23with our strategic priorities.
00:15:26Look forward to your questions.
00:15:27Thank you very much, Mr. Shriver.
00:15:30That's a challenging list that you gave us, but we'll talk about that when we get to the
00:15:35questions.
00:15:37Next we have Dr. Mastro as a center fellow at the Freeman Spagoli Institute for International
00:15:45Studies at Stanford University.
00:15:47She is also a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
00:15:51In addition, she continues to serve in the U.S. Air Force Reserve where she works as
00:15:55a strategic planner at the Pentagon.
00:15:57Her research focuses on the Chinese military, Asia Pacific security issues and coercive
00:16:03diplomacy.
00:16:04Dr. Mastro, the floor is yours.
00:16:09Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and esteemed members of the Senate
00:16:13Foreign Relations Committee.
00:16:15Thank you for the opportunity to present my views today on how to best approach alliance
00:16:19burden sharing in the Indo-Pacific.
00:16:21I will present what types of allied support I believe will be the most strategically consequential
00:16:25for the U.S. ability to deter Chinese aggression and how the United States can better encourage
00:16:31such support.
00:16:34Burden sharing is often framed in financial terms, but if we take a broader perspective,
00:16:38the contributions that our allies can make goes much beyond defense spending.
00:16:43Instead, I would argue that we need to prioritize three other forms of contributions from our
00:16:48allies.
00:16:49First, the United States needs to focus on getting more expansive, flexible, and permanent
00:16:54access, basing an overflight in allied countries in the Indo-Pacific.
00:16:57Second, the United States needs greater influence in what allies invest in to include greater
00:17:03support for U.S. military construction and the development of certain military capabilities
00:17:07that complement rather than duplicate our forces.
00:17:10As the previous witness already mentioned, our allies and partners are doing a lot to
00:17:14support U.S. defense and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
00:17:18If we do require greater access, basing, and overflight, in my written testimony, I lay
00:17:23out some specifics on what I think that could look like for our allies and partners.
00:17:27As I've listed elsewhere, to deter China from using force, especially over Taiwan, the United
00:17:33States needs to implement a denial strategy, the ability to deny China from achieving its
00:17:37goals through force.
00:17:39Some examples of things that we could do with our allies and partners in terms of ABO that
00:17:43could achieve this goal are things such as getting submarine tenders in Japan, more permanent
00:17:49basing in the Philippines, and prioritizing anti-ship capabilities in the southwest islands
00:17:55of Japan.
00:17:56I would also note that the United States should consider renegotiating the relocation of our
00:18:01Marines from Okinawa to Futenma, as that agreement was signed 30 years ago, and does
00:18:06not take into account the rise of China and the consequential changing security environment.
00:18:11In addition to greater access, basing, and overflight, it's important that the United
00:18:15States works with allies and partners so that they spend on the right things, not just spend
00:18:19more.
00:18:20The United States could encourage two types of spending in particular.
00:18:23First, greater contributions to the cost of U.S. military construction.
00:18:28It's important to note that a lot of our allies and partners already contribute significantly
00:18:31to this, in particular Japan, but South Korea could contribute more to these costs.
00:18:38Philippine government, however, is a bit more cash-strapped, and given that the United States
00:18:41is trying to gain access to basing there, this is one of the areas where the United
00:18:45States should be able to make greater financial contributions.
00:18:50Allied defense investment decisions could also be geared to better support U.S. defense
00:18:54industry.
00:18:56The chairman already mentioned the improvements and the contributions of South Korean ship
00:19:00building, and in recent years there have been great developments in research development,
00:19:05licensing production between the United States and Japan, and of course a prime example being
00:19:09the expanded defense cooperation found in AUKUS.
00:19:13The United States could also encourage allies and partners to invest in capability that
00:19:17complement instead of duplicate U.S. capabilities.
00:19:22The third potential impactful area of burden sharing is mission burden sharing.
00:19:28The allies and partners are investing more in the capabilities to deter China and also
00:19:35take on a greater responsibility during crises.
00:19:38For example, the United States might need South Korea to be better positioned to take
00:19:43on responsibilities to counter North Korean hostility during potential conflicts.
00:19:49In this vein, South Korea should also agree to strategic flexibility for the United States,
00:19:54meaning that the U.S. can use our forces on the peninsula for off-peninsula contingencies,
00:19:58i.e. those that involve China.
00:20:02Japan needs to be better prepared to deter conflict in the East China Sea, and Australia,
00:20:06through our cooperation, could have a greater burden of exercising military dominance over
00:20:11key Southeast Asian choke points.
00:20:14Recognizing the United States can't do it all, we should also welcome coordination and
00:20:17cooperation among our allies and partners.
00:20:21Let me conclude by saying that the best way to encourage any sort of burden sharing is
00:20:25not to publicly criticize allies and demand it, but instead, the United States needs to
00:20:30offer more than security protections.
00:20:34Development assistance, political support, technological cooperation, economic benefits,
00:20:39humanitarian aid, and disaster relief, these are some of the most impactful.
00:20:43The public nature of U.S. demands makes it hard for U.S. allies, who are all democracies,
00:20:48to cooperate with the United States and to consider some of the requests that we might
00:20:53make.
00:20:55And some, for alliance burden sharing, it is very important for the United States to
00:20:59have access to all tools of national power in order to convince countries to be better
00:21:04aligned with our defense priorities.
00:21:08It goes without saying that that means the United States needs the full use of all aspects
00:21:12of national power.
00:21:14The recent dissolution of key agencies, such as USAID or the U.S. Agency for Global Media,
00:21:20which oversees Voice of America, these were relatively important and inexpensive tools
00:21:25of U.S. power and influence, and it makes the job of projecting U.S. power overseas
00:21:29even much harder.
00:21:31And I hope, pending appropriate reviews, that the funding and support for these tools resume
00:21:36in the future.
00:21:39Thank you very much, Doctor.
00:21:41Now we'll hear from Dr. Victor Chai, Distinguished University Professor at Georgetown University,
00:21:48the President of the Geopolitics and Foreign Policy Department at the Center for Strategic
00:21:53and International Studies, and a Senior Fellow at the George W. Bush Institute.
00:21:57He served on the NSC and as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the Defense Policy
00:22:02Board across different administrations.
00:22:04Dr. Chai is a leading expert on U.S. alliances, and particularly the U.S.-Korea alliance.
00:22:10Dr. Chai, we'd like to hear from you.
00:22:14Thank you, Chairman.
00:22:15Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen, and members of the committee for the opportunity
00:22:19to speak to you today about U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific.
00:22:22I'm going to make five points that summarize the full statement and data that I've presented
00:22:27and would like to submit for the record.
00:22:30It will be submitted.
00:22:31Thank you, sir.
00:22:32My first point is historical, and that is that our alliance system in Asia, which was
00:22:37created over 70 years ago, has served us very well.
00:22:41It won the Cold War, stopped communist dominoes from falling, reduced poverty, created wealth,
00:22:50and fostered democracy.
00:22:51Nobody could have imagined this outcome 70 years ago.
00:22:55And these alliances are a unique aspect of U.S. power.
00:23:00The second point is with regard to shared threats.
00:23:04As we all know, we face these shared threats, China, the nuclear buildup, missile buildup,
00:23:08assertive behavior in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, East China Sea.
00:23:13This is now complicated by this axis of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and their conduits, Cuba,
00:23:18Iraq, Syria, Venezuela, all actively working in concert to undermine U.S. interests.
00:23:25As we all know, for example, in the Ukraine war, almost 100% of the microelectronics behind
00:23:30Russian weaponry came from China.
00:23:34Glide bombs attacked drones from Iran, and 50% of the munitions today that Russia uses
00:23:39is sourced from North Korea.
00:23:41So the U.S. has to prevail against these threats, but we cannot do it alone.
00:23:45We need our alliances.
00:23:46In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. has 24 persistent bases and access to 20 other sites.
00:23:53By contrast, China has one overseas base.
00:23:57These bases allow for rapid response, successful defense and deterrence, but at the same time,
00:24:02these alliances are in need of reform and modernization.
00:24:07My third point is with regard to burden sharing, and the main point here is that allies are
00:24:12much more capable of bearing host nation costs than they were 50 years ago.
00:24:17Many of the algorithms we use are legacies of the past, but at the same time, any changes
00:24:23should avoid surprises to give our allies in the region the domestic political space
00:24:28to sell new agreements to their publics, as these sorts of agreements need to be ratified
00:24:33by their legislatures, unlike the case in the United States.
00:24:38Burden sharing algorithms that exponentially increase allied payments will not be feasible
00:24:43unless they take into account allied contributions outside of the alliance on behalf of the alliance,
00:24:50such as the $18 billion that Japan has provided in support to Ukraine, the $3 plus billion
00:24:55that South Korea has done as well.
00:25:00These burden sharing contributions need to be documented as per legislation like the
00:25:05Allied Burden Sharing Report Act.
00:25:08My fourth point is with regard to access basing and overflight.
00:25:11The United States increasingly operates in a contested basing environment to include
00:25:16cost constraints, adversary tactics, and the vagaries of domestic political leadership
00:25:20in these host countries.
00:25:23Gaining access to allied bases and civilian facilities for pre-positioning of kinetic
00:25:27and non-kinetic capabilities is as much political as it is a military exercise.
00:25:33It requires socializing publics and governments not just at the national level but also at
00:25:37the local level to understand the role they play in national security.
00:25:42In the case of Japan, this means securing access to JSDF and civilian facilities in
00:25:47the dispersed positions in the southwest island chain.
00:25:51It also means the U.S. commitment to following through on the promise to create a joint force
00:25:57headquarters to coordinate with the newly established J-JOC in Japan.
00:26:02In Korea, this means not just a military but also a political discussion with the next
00:26:06South Korean government about the role of the Korean military and the U.S. military
00:26:11in a Taiwan contingency.
00:26:13South Korea has made good statements with regard to Taiwan's defense in the previous
00:26:17two leaders' summits, but now comes the hard part, bringing political consensus to
00:26:22think about changes that include things like force presence on the peninsula, rear area
00:26:27support, and South Korean capabilities to deter North Korea in the event of opportunistic
00:26:32aggression in a Taiwan contingency.
00:26:36The other point I wanted to make about ABO strategy is to complement our military access
00:26:41arrangements with a strategy to stop Chinese economic coercion.
00:26:46This is because our access could be compromised by Chinese commercial pressure on host economies
00:26:51with regard to our arrangements.
00:26:53In this regard, U.S. Indo-Pacific allies need to take a page from the EU anti-coercion instrument
00:26:59and build a collective economic deterrence framework that is not just an economic strategy
00:27:04but is related to our military and ABO strategy.
00:27:08My last point is that the update of our alliances should include burden-sharing in terms of
00:27:14allied participation in global governance institutions when our traditional institutions
00:27:19of global governance like the UN Security Council are underperforming.
00:27:22In this regard, the State Department should formalize the IP4, Indo-Pacific 4 grouping,
00:27:29as regular participants in global governance institutions like the NATO Leaders' Summit
00:27:34and the G7.
00:27:35These allies can help carry forward like-minded agendas as the United States consolidates
00:27:40its power at home.
00:27:42Thank you very much.
00:27:43Thank you very much, Doctor.
00:27:45We'll now do a round of questions, and if there's interest, we'll do a second round.
00:27:52And I'm going to start, first of all, with you, Mr. Shriver.
00:27:57You talked about, and I don't mean this to sound critical, but you were questioning the
00:28:05use of percentage GDP as a commitment to what a country thinks it should do to defend itself.
00:28:13I've always had the same thought myself.
00:28:15My problem is I can't think of another thing that you can use to measure it.
00:28:19Do you have any other measuring devices that you have in mind that you think might be appropriate
00:28:24in that regard?
00:28:26We see this across government.
00:28:28A lot of times they'll take a broad brush and try to measure something with something
00:28:33that isn't exactly related, but your thoughts on that, please.
00:28:41Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:28:45What I meant to say is it's important, but many times insufficient.
00:28:49And in other instances, there are factors that should be weighted more heavily, like
00:28:55in the case of the Philippines, nine new ECTA sites, including those with geographic proximity
00:29:00to the Taiwan Strait, is extremely valuable, even though they're only spending 1.5 percent
00:29:05of GDP from a relatively small economy.
00:29:08So I'm afraid it comes down to more of a qualitative assessment of weighing these different baskets.
00:29:13What are they doing on ABO?
00:29:14What are they doing on their own defense?
00:29:18And you get really sort of qualitative when you get to history.
00:29:21I think it counts that Australia has fought alongside us in every war since World War
00:29:24II, and I think that gives us confidence they'll be alongside us in the future.
00:29:28And to me, that is a part of having confidence in them sharing a burden in the worst of times.
00:29:34But that gets very hard to chart on a graph and measure.
00:29:39And I appreciate that, particularly with Australia.
00:29:41I mean, I never even think about what percent they spend on – it doesn't matter to me.
00:29:46These people are friends and have been with us through thick and thin, and that counts
00:29:51for way more than anything that you could talk about statistically.
00:29:56I'd like – I'm going to give all three of you a short run at this.
00:30:01Something I've been very impressed with in recent times has been the Philippines'
00:30:08desire to have us as an ally and vice versa.
00:30:12And we all know they're making real effort in that regard.
00:30:16What are the Chinese doing about this?
00:30:18Their reaction, obviously, is going to be negative.
00:30:21How does that actually materialize in reality?
00:30:26Why don't we start with you, Mr. Stryver, and we'll go across.
00:30:31Well, they're certainly behaving aggressively toward the Philippines in the disputed territories.
00:30:36There's a lot of activity around Second Thomas Shoal that includes water cannons being
00:30:40fired from Coast Guard vessels, includes shouldering of Filipino vessels.
00:30:45But I think also what's going on is a lot of attempts at elite capture and economic
00:30:51coercion, as Dr. Cha mentioned.
00:30:53They're very focused on upcoming elections in the Philippines and what they might be
00:30:57able to do to tip the balance.
00:30:59So they're playing a little bit of a long game, too, in addition to the points of coercion
00:31:04that are much more acute.
00:31:06So clearly they don't like it.
00:31:08But from our perspective, we can't have an ectocyte and have the Chinese go around
00:31:13and buy up everything around it in terms of the electrical grid, in terms of the communication
00:31:16systems, in terms of the local infrastructure.
00:31:19We have to be able to address it in a more comprehensive way.
00:31:23Dr. Master?
00:31:24Thank you, Chairman.
00:31:27In terms of the things that the Chinese are doing, if you look at Chinese writings and
00:31:31speeches about the U.S. alliance system, generally speaking, I think it's very telling that they
00:31:36spend a lot of energy in their discourse and their behavior and their capabilities trying
00:31:41to undermine the U.S. alliance system.
00:31:43To me, the fact that they're leveraging some of these discussions right now in the United
00:31:47States, what the United States is doing vis-a-vis Ukraine, for example, and, for example, the
00:31:53dissolution of some of our key agencies like USAID, they're using those to say that, one,
00:31:58the United States is not a reliable ally, and, two, they're also increasing their military
00:32:04presence around a lot of key allies and partners like Japan, the Philippines, and their aggression
00:32:10towards Taiwan.
00:32:11When I speak to the Chinese military directly and I ask them about their military activities
00:32:15in these areas, they tell me that they are specifically designed to demonstrate to allies
00:32:20and partners that the United States cannot help them, that in the case of their defense,
00:32:25even though the United States military is a significant force, given the fact that we
00:32:29are not forward-deployed sufficiently, that those countries would be on their own.
00:32:33So there is this implicit military coercion that is occurring, and, at the same time,
00:32:38they are offering a lot of positive inducements to some countries in the region.
00:32:42If we alienate certain partners in the Indo-Pacific, in particular in Southeast Asia, if we ask
00:32:47them to pick sides, I'm not sure we'll like what side Singapore or even the Philippines
00:32:52might pick in the end.
00:32:54And so, for that reason, the Chinese are leveraging both their economic coercion as well as positive
00:32:59inducements.
00:33:01The development assistance that the Chinese are giving to Southeast Asian countries in
00:33:05particular is significant.
00:33:07And for access, basing, and overflight, the United States is trying to expand our relationships
00:33:12with countries in the second island chain, for example, Palau, or the Federated States
00:33:16of Micronesia.
00:33:17These are not countries that are under direct military threat from Beijing, and so it's
00:33:21really some of the programs we mentioned, such as development assistance, economic assistance,
00:33:28military training, that convince these countries to allow U.S. access.
00:33:32And on the same hand, the other side of the ledger, they have the Chinese coming in with
00:33:36elite capture and economic incentives.
00:33:40And so, for that reason, it's very important, I think, that we focus on the military side,
00:33:43but also the economic and political side as well.
00:33:46Appreciate that.
00:33:47Dr. Cha.
00:33:48Just to add quickly, to add to what's been said, it's not just elite capture, it's dominating
00:33:54sort of the information space and the media partnerships with lots of basically resource-poor
00:34:01media in the Philippines.
00:34:03And so that needs to be combated in some way, and so things like RFA and VOA are actually
00:34:08quite important in that respect.
00:34:10And then I'll go back to the point on commercial pressure.
00:34:12I mean, as Randy said, there are nine access sites.
00:34:16China knows how to put very directed commercial pressure, perhaps on certain localities, to
00:34:23try to complicate our ability to gain access to those sites.
00:34:27And so having some sort of collective strategy among Asia-Pacific partners, again, sort of
00:34:33like the EU has done with the ACI, is something that is important for ABO, I think, ABO strategy.
00:34:40Senator Shaheen.
00:34:42Dr. Cha, you mentioned, and I think the other two panelists also suggested this, that the
00:34:51new cooperation between Russia and China and North Korea on the war in Ukraine is having
00:34:59an impact.
00:35:00Can you talk about the impact that that's having to our, throughout the Indo-Pacific
00:35:05and the concerns that that raises with our other allies in the region?
00:35:16I'm happy to, Senator.
00:35:17So I think it has had sort of three effects.
00:35:22The first is, it has clearly had an effect on the battlefield in the sense that 12,000
00:35:28North Korean troops in Kursk to try to regain some territory before peace negotiations start.
00:35:34Again, 50% of Russian munitions today reportedly is sourced from North Korea.
00:35:40These are having real impacts on the battlefield.
00:35:42That's the first point.
00:35:43The second is that it has really created a lot of concern among Indo-Pacific partners
00:35:51that anything is possible in Asia now.
00:35:55War in the middle of Europe that looks like a war from days past caused them to think
00:35:59not only is war in the Taiwan Straits possible, not only is war in the Korean Peninsula possible,
00:36:04but these things could happen at the same time through opportunistic aggression.
00:36:09So the first time we've started getting inquiries from both South Korean and Taiwan friends
00:36:15to think more trilaterally about those sorts of dual contingency scenarios.
00:36:19And then the third effect, I think, is it has really closed the gap between the way
00:36:24our European friends, our Indo-Pacific friends, think about security.
00:36:29There's no longer two theaters.
00:36:30It really is one theater.
00:36:31I have actually, I think in the past year, made more trips to Brussels than I have to
00:36:37the Indo-Pacific region because of all the interest in Asia.
00:36:41And the level of conversation I think my colleagues would agree in Europe on Indo-Pacific security
00:36:46now is at a much, much higher level than it was even a year ago.
00:36:50So those would be the three things I would say.
00:36:54Do either of you want to add to that?
00:36:55Yes, Dr. Mastro.
00:36:58Thank you, ma'am.
00:36:59I would add for the China-Russia relationship in particular, there are four main things
00:37:04that they are complicating for the United States.
00:37:07But first and foremost, their relationship is making it harder for the United States
00:37:11to deter the two countries independently.
00:37:14And then I think we can see with Ukraine, and I would predict it would be the same thing
00:37:17in the Indo-Pacific, it makes it harder for us to compel them to stop fighting.
00:37:21And the reasons for that is, first, these two countries, while they might not fight
00:37:25together in the sort of interoperable alliance framework, they are serving and building the
00:37:32ability to serve as a strategic rear to one another.
00:37:35So let me interrupt for a minute, because in some quarters, there's a suggestion that
00:37:40we can actually pull Russia away from China and separate the two of them.
00:37:47Can you speak to that?
00:37:48And Dr. Cha, you may want to speak to that as well as Mr. Shriver.
00:37:54I would say generally speaking, I've done a historical review of the relationship since
00:37:581949, and the idea that you could present positive inducements or try to convince Russia,
00:38:04for example, that China is a greater threat than the United States, or vice versa, is
00:38:07not going to work.
00:38:08The best strategy, if we had any hope of pulling them apart, is that for now, while European
00:38:14countries are more concerned about the Indo-Pacific, it is not the case that they're reacting to
00:38:18China as if China is such a strong partner to Russia.
00:38:22They still have very strong economic relations with China, and they're reluctant to punish
00:38:26China for that relationship.
00:38:28If the Chinese thought it would come at an economic cost, their relationship with Russia,
00:38:32I think they would be much better geared to pull apart.
00:38:35So NATO could play a greater role in that economic relationship with China to show them
00:38:41that they can't just get all the military benefits from Russia without some diplomatic
00:38:46and economic costs.
00:38:47Mr. Shriver, do you have any?
00:38:49I'd be highly suspicious of that endeavor, I think, particularly with Mr. Putin and Xi
00:38:56Jinping and the relationship that they've developed and the mutual reinforcing activities
00:39:03that have made them alliance-like.
00:39:06I'd also point out some people refer to this as the reverse Kissinger.
00:39:09Of course, when Kissinger courted China, China and Russia had already, then the Soviet Union,
00:39:15had already had a very significant falling out.
00:39:17So it wasn't creating a fissure, it was taking advantage of a fissure.
00:39:23Dr. Chang, anything to add?
00:39:24I was actually going to make a similar point as Randy's.
00:39:27I mean, I think in international relations, that sort of diplomacy only works if you occupy
00:39:32the pivot position where the other two sides are coming to you.
00:39:36That's what was happening with Kissingerian diplomacy between the Soviet Union and China.
00:39:42In this case, if we were to try a reverse Kissinger, it would be Russia that occupies
00:39:47the pivot position.
00:39:49And so for that reason, I think it would be suspect.
00:39:53Senator Ricketts.
00:39:54Great.
00:39:55Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses here today to talk about this
00:40:01very important topic.
00:40:03Since signing of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the Philippines has been one of our key allies
00:40:09in the Pacific.
00:40:10However, in recent years, the alliance has grown both more important and even more key
00:40:17as far as our strategic alignment.
00:40:19Despite being outmatched militarily and economically, the Philippines have demonstrated an incredible
00:40:25resolve in resisting Beijing's unlawful aggression in the South China Sea, certainly more recently.
00:40:33It is also able to act as an important voice within the ASEAN against communist China's
00:40:37other pressure campaigns that you all have been talking about.
00:40:41But the most important is what the alliance provides us militarily.
00:40:45And Mr. Shriver, you were talking about the expansion of the EDCA bases and the nine strategic
00:40:51sites that they've given us access to, to enhance our ability to deter communist China
00:40:56in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and other key theaters.
00:40:59It's also allowed us to deploy the Taifan missile system, which can hold land-based
00:41:04targets and China at risk as well as surface ships.
00:41:11How important is it for us to continue to work with Manila to expand U.S. access to
00:41:17these sites and further invest in the infrastructure and housing for U.S. troops, Mr. Shriver?
00:41:26I think it's extraordinarily important.
00:41:27And if you kind of racked and stacked in the region, I would put the Philippines right
00:41:31at the top of where we need to invest, given its geography and given a window of opportunity.
00:41:36You know, the last administration in Manila under President Duterte wasn't exactly user-friendly,
00:41:43if you will.
00:41:44Marcos has been a sea change and really more of a return to the norm, but a sea change
00:41:51nonetheless.
00:41:52And I think we should take advantage of that.
00:41:55And frankly, the population, given Chinese aggression and coercion, is also very much
00:42:01in support of strengthening U.S.-Philippine ties.
00:42:04And I think it's the time to make the investments that are needed.
00:42:07Great.
00:42:08And, you know, we were just talking about China's really aggressive position toward
00:42:12the Philippines and these gray zone attacks in the South China Sea.
00:42:17You mentioned some of the areas there.
00:42:20It's really, really valuable that Manila shows this defiance, isn't it, Mr. Shriver?
00:42:26It is.
00:42:27They're, of course, first and foremost responsible for their own defense.
00:42:29And I think they have done a very admirable job on these resupply missions to Second
00:42:34Thomas Shoal, really resisting that Chinese pressure and coercion.
00:42:38So what else can we or Japan or Australia do to be able to support the Philippines as
00:42:44they resist this gray zone activity here in the South China Sea?
00:42:48Well, I think Chinese coercion is not limited to South China Sea.
00:42:53So I think pushback in the East China Sea, pushback in areas closer to Vietnam.
00:43:00It's a comprehensive approach that is led by the U.S. but joined with allies and partners
00:43:05will I think demonstrate to the Chinese that they've got a broader problem, that the country
00:43:10that signed UNCLOS and ratified it but does not honor it and acts outside it is going
00:43:15to face broad pushback.
00:43:17And then on point in the Philippines, I do think we need to resume our cooperation with
00:43:21the Philippine Coast Guard, which is now on pause because it's a state INL program
00:43:26and it's a law enforcement program.
00:43:29The Coast Guard is really on the front lines, not necessarily the Navy in every case.
00:43:33So I think there's a number of things we can do, and again, it's extraordinarily important.
00:43:38What about the cooperation between Japan and the Philippines?
00:43:40They've recently, you know, gotten some agreements together.
00:43:45What do you think about that?
00:43:46Very encouraging.
00:43:47I mean, if you looked at a map, Japan, Philippines, what's in the middle?
00:43:51It's Taiwan.
00:43:52And I think a lot of the security cooperation is oriented toward that major known contingency.
00:43:58But Japan is also stepping up with security assistance.
00:44:01So we are no longer the sole provider or only provider of military equipment and other training
00:44:06and other types of services.
00:44:09Japan is a very professional military, and they're lending that expertise to the Philippines
00:44:13in very helpful ways.
00:44:15I think we've provided about $500 million last year in FMS to the Philippines, and obviously
00:44:19it's encouraging to see Japan do that as well.
00:44:22And you were also talking about, you know, the percent of GDP that the Philippines is
00:44:26spending and valuing, you know, the bases and so forth.
00:44:30Is it fair for us to ask the Philippines to get to 2 percent of GDP spending on their
00:44:35own defense?
00:44:36I mean, they are trying to modernize here.
00:44:39I'm for being aspirational, and I think given the threat they're facing, it's reasonable
00:44:43to ask.
00:44:45I think those discussions, that's why we need skilled diplomats.
00:44:48That's why we need capable alliance managers with years of experience.
00:44:52I agree there are some approaches, as Dr. Mastro pointed out, that can have negative
00:44:56effects.
00:44:57And so I think we need to do it with a degree of deftness.
00:45:01But it is important.
00:45:02Do the Philippines have that kind of capability?
00:45:03I mean, can they economically support 2 percent of GDP, do you think?
00:45:09The short answer I would say is yes.
00:45:14But it is a very robust democracy.
00:45:16They have a lot of other priorities when it comes to development of the economy.
00:45:19So this would be grinding it out through the legislature.
00:45:22But I think they could get there given the threat and the very real requirements they
00:45:26have for defense.
00:45:27Great.
00:45:28Thank you, Mr. Schreiber.
00:45:29Senator Coons.
00:45:30Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:45:31Thank you to our witnesses.
00:45:32Dr. Cha, you've spoken extensively about the alignment of some of our core adversaries
00:45:37and as you just referenced in your opening statement, support from China, Iran, North
00:45:41Korea is absolutely critical to Russia's war effort against Ukraine.
00:45:45But many, I think, are now underestimating what these three countries are getting in
00:45:49return for that partnership.
00:45:51Could you just speak briefly to what North Korea is or could be gaining from their munitions
00:45:57support, their now active troop support, and the negative impacts this might be having
00:46:01in the Indo-Pacific region and how our allies are viewing it and how they might step up?
00:46:06Sure, Senator.
00:46:09Your question really points to the fact that what is happening in the war in Ukraine has
00:46:14serious impact on what's happening in Indo-Pacific security as well.
00:46:18Initially, I think when the Biden administration publicized the first arms transfer to the
00:46:25Wagner Group, we became very worried that this was the start of a relationship between
00:46:30these two that would only grow as Russia's need for munitions and troops also grew.
00:46:36Initially, we think that what was being provided was largely a lot of food and fuel and energy,
00:46:43things that were really stocked out in North Korea after a three and a half year lockdown
00:46:47from COVID.
00:46:48I mean, for North Korea, this opportunity with Russia emerged just as they were coming
00:46:54after a three and a half year COVID lockdown.
00:46:56So this was like a Christmas present for them.
00:47:01The concern now is that it has moved beyond food, fuel, and energy and medicines to sort
00:47:08of higher end military technology.
00:47:11I think if we track U.S. government statements about this, they have moved from statements
00:47:15about the theoretical or hypothetical to a statement of fact.
00:47:20We have seen this, I think, also in North Korea's own actions and demonstrations.
00:47:28Total military satellite launches after successive failures, they became more successful after
00:47:33Kim Jong Un's first visit to Russia.
00:47:35So it's your view that North Korea is almost certainly receiving sophisticated missile,
00:47:39satellite, military assistance from Russia in exchange for their support?
00:47:44Yes.
00:47:45And the one I would in particular point to is potential nuclear propelled submarine technology
00:47:50because the North Koreans put the leader in front of a new submarine and said, this is
00:47:55a nuclear powered submarine.
00:47:56So this is the one that I think has gotten the most attention recently.
00:48:00But yes, all those things.
00:48:01I have limited time.
00:48:03You also spoke about the critical role that Radio Free Asia provides.
00:48:07It's got a $60 million budget, but reaches 60 million people a week.
00:48:12Given upcoming elections in the Philippines, given our concern about soft power and influence
00:48:18in the region, Pacific Island nations, how wise or foolish is it that the administration
00:48:24just canceled Radio Free Asia?
00:48:26So again, I think our access basing and overflight strategy is directly related to competition
00:48:33in the information space, where China is creating these media partnerships all over the global
00:48:39South and creating a narrative of the United States that is clearly counter to our interests.
00:48:45So we need to be able to push back on that with real, accurate information.
00:48:49And that comes from places like VOA and RFA.
00:48:52Dr. Mastro, you spoke to the fact that the PRC is taking advantage of our abrupt withdrawal
00:48:58from hundreds of different development partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific.
00:49:03Just speak, if you would, briefly to what kind of challenge you think it's creating
00:49:07for us and our strategic interests for us to have abruptly canceled and shut down economic
00:49:14development partnerships, public health partnerships, things like providing reliable energy to our
00:49:21new basing opportunities in the Philippines, providing partnerships in terms of intel and
00:49:27communications security in the Philippines.
00:49:30What's the strategic impact to our abrupt withdrawal as partners for dozens and dozens
00:49:35of programs across these key countries?
00:49:40So sir, I think the first thing to mention is if we are having a hard time assessing
00:49:44what is impactful for the competition with China or not, it's always useful to look at
00:49:48what the Chinese are spending on and what they're saying.
00:49:51So they spend eight times more than we do on public diplomacy.
00:49:54And as Dr. Cha already mentioned with all of their information centers with Xinhua and
00:49:59others, they're obviously extremely focused in this area.
00:50:03What's important for the Indo-Pacific is that a lot of these countries are not, it's very
00:50:08different than the NATO allies and partners in that many of these countries have a lot
00:50:13of incentives not to support the United States militarily.
00:50:16And so what we have on offer, if they're not threatened with direct invasion from China,
00:50:20which even allies like Australia are not, what we have on offer are other things besides
00:50:26just that security cooperation.
00:50:28So when we build infrastructure, for example, in the Philippines, there's this understanding
00:50:32that with that foreign development and assistance, that type of infrastructure can be used by
00:50:36the Philippines when US forces aren't there.
00:50:38And so without those types of commitments, there's a lot of countries that they put themselves
00:50:43at risk, that the threat from China becomes greater the more they cooperate with us.
00:50:48And so the only way to outbalance that is with the economic incentives offering humanitarian
00:50:53aid, disaster relief, foreign development assistance.
00:50:56And that's why the Chinese are so focused on those tools of power.
00:50:59Well, thank you.
00:51:01I think we're making an enormous mistake in unilaterally and abruptly shutting down longstanding
00:51:06humanitarian economic development, infrastructure, and relief programs throughout the Indo-Pacific.
00:51:14Senator McCormick.
00:51:15Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, thank you, and thank you to our panelists.
00:51:18A free and open Indo-Pacific is critical to our nation's security.
00:51:22I think we all agree on that.
00:51:23To paraphrase General MacArthur, the Pacific Axe is a protective shield for all the Americas,
00:51:29with the Western Pacific as its linchpin.
00:51:32And so I'm excited to have this great group to talk about the alliances that are so central
00:51:38to that shield.
00:51:40Because they're on the front lines of defending against China, the Chinese Communist Party's
00:51:44aggression and escalating efforts and expansionist ambitions in the first island chain.
00:51:51We must stand with those allies and ensure those partnerships deliver unmatched value
00:51:55to both sides, including burden sharing.
00:51:58So Mr. Cha, Dr. Cha, good to see you again, and I'd like to start with you.
00:52:04Japan has been one of the allies where we've seen the most progress in increasing defense
00:52:08investment and operability with U.S. forces.
00:52:11We recently had Ambassador-designate Glass testify before this committee.
00:52:16What priorities should be top of mind for him and for this administration to make that
00:52:21deterrence from the U.S.-Japan alliance most credible?
00:52:27Thank you, Senator.
00:52:28So I would say that there are three things.
00:52:33The first is, as I mentioned in my testimony, the Japanese stood up the J-JOC, the Japan
00:52:41Joint Operational Command.
00:52:42It was a big step in the alliance to try to create a much more militarily capable, interoperable,
00:52:47integrated relationship with the United States.
00:52:50And so it's incumbent on our side to really fulfill our commitment to create a joint force
00:52:55headquarters.
00:52:56So I think that's one.
00:52:57Even though that's not necessarily a diplomatic thing, it's an important message to send.
00:53:02The second is, what I would like to see is a continuation of the bilateral and the trilateral
00:53:10relationship among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea.
00:53:13This was something that both the first Trump administration as well as the Biden administration
00:53:18worked on.
00:53:20Major steps were made since August of 2023.
00:53:24I know we have a political, a little bit of a political situation in South Korea waiting
00:53:28for a new government to come into place.
00:53:30But in terms of defense and deterrence and making more credible the U.S. position in
00:53:34Asia and giving confidence to allies in the Indo-Pacific as well as in Europe about U.S.
00:53:40sustained commitment, I think that's extremely important as well.
00:53:45And then the third are the things that my colleagues have mentioned in terms of Japan's
00:53:48role in places like the Philippines and in other parts of Asia where they can, in Taiwan,
00:53:55where they can play a very important role in helping to complement what the United States
00:53:59is doing in terms of access, spacing, and overflight.
00:54:03Very good.
00:54:05Mr. Shriver, Secretary Rubio recently reiterated U.S. policy with regard to Taiwan.
00:54:11Any forced, compelled, coercive change in the status of Taiwan, where would you see
00:54:20the United States falling short in its role in deterring a war in the Taiwan Strait?
00:54:29Thank you, Senator.
00:54:30So I think I would point to a few things.
00:54:33And it's not necessarily falling short, but there's been an evolutionary process where
00:54:37we've been more direct in our language and rhetoric.
00:54:40We've been moving into areas that were previously too sensitive, like training of Taiwanese
00:54:46military forces.
00:54:48So I think we need to continue the posture initiatives.
00:54:52We really need to develop the Philippines, particularly northern Luzon, which has that
00:54:56geographic proximity to the Taiwan Strait.
00:54:59We need to strengthen our training of Taiwan military forces.
00:55:03That was a taboo for decades.
00:55:05And now we're getting them to a point where they're more professional, more proficient,
00:55:09as they're placing a greater emphasis on training.
00:55:12And I think, as Dr. Mastro implied in her opening statement, it's not only what they
00:55:17spend.
00:55:18They've got to 2.5.
00:55:19They pledged to get to 3 percent, and they say that's a floor, not a ceiling.
00:55:22But it's what they spend it in and what they invest on.
00:55:25I think, given the changing nature of warfare, they need to look at modernized command and
00:55:30control that will help optimize battlefield decisions.
00:55:33They need to look at a lot more unmanned autonomous in every domain, including underwater.
00:55:38So I think we need to help lead them in this investment strategy as really keyed up holding
00:55:43deterrence.
00:55:44Very good.
00:55:47I'll yield the rest of my time.
00:55:49Senator Duckworth.
00:55:51Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
00:55:53Thank you all for being here today.
00:55:55My office has been hearing about how vital initiatives aimed at advancing American interests
00:55:59in the Indo-Pacific have been stalled over the last several weeks, and this is following
00:56:03up on my colleagues' interest in the Indo-Pacific as well.
00:56:07This includes not only critical programs, but also essential funding that supports intelligence
00:56:11efforts on pressing regional issues.
00:56:14I'm deeply concerned that the current administration is pursuing a path that directly contradicts
00:56:19strengthening Indo-Pacific alliances, a move that could have far-reaching implications
00:56:22for our security.
00:56:24And like my colleagues have mentioned, I am deeply concerned about the PRC's activities
00:56:27in the region.
00:56:29Before this administration, the United States led with a clear strategy, invest, align,
00:56:34compete, in response to this PRC's growing geopolitical influence in the Indo-Pacific.
00:56:40And we demonstrated that strength by consistently following through on our commitments, proving
00:56:45to our allies that the U.S. is a reliable partner, a leader in defending democracy,
00:56:49and a defender of international norms.
00:56:51This strategy was central to our global leadership in maintaining peace and stability in the
00:56:56region.
00:56:57And unfortunately, we are walking backwards, as the Trump-Asia policy of today seems to
00:57:01be neglecting our well-established alliances, institutions, the rule of law, and rules.
00:57:06And I am a co-founder of the bipartisan Quad Caucus, and I made it a priority to send a
00:57:10clear and powerful message to our allies, partners, and even competitors that the United
00:57:15States is committed to the Indo-Pacific region in the long term.
00:57:18And I wholeheartedly believe that defense diplomacy and cooperation are crucial.
00:57:22Mr. Shriver, as someone who has held a key in shaping U.S. defense policy in the Indo-Pacific,
00:57:26what specific steps should the United States take to demonstrate its long-term commitment
00:57:31to the Indo-Pacific and its allies within the context of the Quad?
00:57:37Thank you, Senator Duckworth, and thank you for your leadership on the Quad.
00:57:40It's very important.
00:57:41So I'm the only one up here who's not a professor, but if I were to give this administration
00:57:45a grade, it wouldn't be failing, it would be incomplete.
00:57:47Because I think they've done some very positive things.
00:57:51The Prime Minister's Sheba visit, Prime Minister Modi's meeting with President Trump.
00:57:55And I would point to Secretary Rubio's decision on the very first day in office to hold a
00:57:59Quad meeting as part of that positive agenda, notwithstanding some of the other issues that
00:58:05you mentioned, and I share some of your concerns, I'm sure.
00:58:08I think that what we understand took place in that Quad meeting at the foreign minister
00:58:14level is there was a very kind of nascent discussion about moving into the security
00:58:20issues.
00:58:22And that's significant that Foreign Minister Jaishankar would go along with that and actually
00:58:27introduce some of that, as I understand it, which indicates India is sufficiently concerned
00:58:32that they're willing to take this format and move it into military and security issues.
00:58:37So I would like to see that nurtured and matured and even perhaps go operational.
00:58:42We've got a lot of PLA activity in the Indian Ocean now.
00:58:45Anti-submarine warfare cooperation could happen quietly, but it could involve the four countries
00:58:50doing real world things that would be very significant.
00:58:54Don't you think that that is also a place where we can strengthen our relationship with
00:59:01Quad, but also not alienate important regional partners like ASEAN?
00:59:06And I do think that there is a need to strengthen economic relations with the Quad, but in a
00:59:10way that complements our relationship with ASEAN and their leadership role.
00:59:15So I'm asking both economic cooperation, but also cooperation, especially when it comes
00:59:19to strategies where the Chinese are really infiltrating into the region.
00:59:27Go ahead.
00:59:29I do agree with that.
00:59:30I think you're the expert on ASEAN, but it's a region of very mixed stages of development,
00:59:39different types of government.
00:59:40And so I think disaggregating and looking at where the Quad can be helpful as a donor,
00:59:46as an economic partner, I think that kind of sophisticated approach would really help
00:59:51counter what China's doing.
00:59:52And China is gaining ground in Southeast Asia, there's no doubt about it.
00:59:57And we're seeing a lot of it, particularly since the tariffs, we're seeing a lot of Chinese
01:00:00investment going into Southeast Asia, some of which is helpful to them, but some of which
01:00:04is also overcapacity, crowding out some of their indigenous manufacturing and aspects
01:00:10of their economy.
01:00:11So I would like to see the Quad do more in this area.
01:00:13Yeah, because I think Quad investment into ASEAN, maybe as part of the supply chain manufacturing
01:00:19issues for the United States is an opportunity.
01:00:23And frankly, we've come off a very strong year in ASEAN of Indonesian leadership.
01:00:27The Malaysians are doing a great job there now, Philippines are next.
01:00:30I think there's some real opportunities there for some partnerships.
01:00:33And I would like to see the United States continue to pursue those economic relationships
01:00:37in addition to their strategic partnerships, but making those linkages between Quad and
01:00:42ASEAN.
01:00:43Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
01:00:46Thank you, Senator Edwards.
01:00:47Senator Cornyn.
01:00:48Thank you all for being here.
01:00:51Mr. Shriver, I like your characterization of the tyranny of time and distance when it
01:00:57comes to the Taiwan contingency.
01:01:01We like to talk about very euphemistic terms, which could be a bloody and very destructive
01:01:07military conflict.
01:01:10First, let me ask you about supply chains.
01:01:18The reason why Senator Warner and I and many of our colleagues joined together and passed
01:01:23the Chips and Science Act starting back in 2020, but then finally, I guess in 2022, was
01:01:30because we were worried about the supply chains of advanced semiconductors and the
01:01:36fact that the United States only made about 12 percent of those.
01:01:41And the fact that in this world we live in, we are extraordinarily dependent on that sort
01:01:48of technology for everything from our iPhones to the avionics and the Joint Strike Fighter.
01:02:00Are there other supply chains that we need to be concerned about in the event of another
01:02:05pandemic, natural disaster, or a military conflict in the Indo-Pacific?
01:02:12And I would invite anybody to offer any advice now, and if you want to get back to us with
01:02:19a more comprehensive list, I would welcome that.
01:02:26Thank you, Senator.
01:02:27I think when you look at something like chips, you've got to understand the component parts,
01:02:33which gets down to critical minerals and the mining and the processing, and so it's a very
01:02:37complex supply chain.
01:02:39And where I think we can do better now to better position us for resiliency in the event
01:02:45of a conflict is to really look at alternate sources of critical minerals and that processing
01:02:50and that whole sort of chain of production.
01:02:55Right now we are heavily relying on China.
01:02:57Yeah, China processes 90 percent, 90 percent as I recall.
01:03:05Any other thoughts on supply chains from the other panelists?
01:03:09I just want to add that there's no entity that is in a better position to protect U.S.
01:03:16interests than the United States itself.
01:03:18And when we pull out of the Indo-Pacific, we are basically outsourcing that to another
01:03:22country like China, and China itself has a Made in China 2025 standard, 2035.
01:03:28They've identified 15 areas where not only do they want to be self-sufficient so that
01:03:34we have less power to shape their decisions, but they've been very explicit that they want
01:03:38the world to be reliant on them precisely so they have this type of leverage that you
01:03:42are talking about.
01:03:43In any scenario involving Taiwan, the Chinese are hoping this is going to be a quick war,
01:03:49you know, three to four weeks.
01:03:51And even in those types of scenarios, the disruption economically is going to be significant.
01:03:56But the United States needs to be in the position that we could intervene in that time frame
01:04:00so that what we threaten is much more of a global disruption to the Chinese themselves.
01:04:05Well, because time is so short, let me start with Dr. Cha on this question.
01:04:11You talk about how long the Taiwan contingency conflict will last.
01:04:19My impression from traveling in the region is that we have a lot of wonderful allies
01:04:25that have capabilities, and they vary a lot depending on the nation.
01:04:34But we've seen in Ukraine, there's a difference between capability and will.
01:04:40And one of the things that I am very concerned about is we are overestimating what our allies
01:04:47might be willing to do.
01:04:49I think, Dr. Castro, you mentioned they're reluctant to take sides.
01:04:53That seemed to be the typical response we got as we were talking to folks in the Indo-Pacific.
01:05:02But in terms of – and I know this is a hard question and maybe one we don't want to confront,
01:05:07but I don't think we have any choice but to confront.
01:05:11If there was a shooting war in the South China Sea where, according to President Xi's
01:05:18instructions to the PLA, they needed to be ready by 2027 to essentially take Taiwan,
01:05:24who can we depend on?
01:05:27What countries?
01:05:29And if you could list those in terms of our – of who would be the most likely and who
01:05:36would be the most effective, that would be very useful.
01:05:40Well, sir, if I can just say, we can depend on Japan to allow us access to U.S. bases
01:05:46at the very least.
01:05:48Japanese logistical support will be critical, but that will only come into play in a more
01:05:52protracted conflict if the United States does intervene in time.
01:05:55The northern Philippines and southwest Japan are the only areas in combat radius of Taiwan.
01:06:01And so the immediate support of use of U.S. bases, and in the Philippines in particular,
01:06:05we're not investing right now in the types of air and naval capabilities that we need
01:06:10to be able to respond in a timely manner in the Taiwan Strait.
01:06:14But if we did that, it would basically be the almost immediate permission to use those
01:06:20bases in the northern Philippines and southwest Japan for direct kinetic action against the
01:06:25ships making their way across the strait that would be by far the most critical.
01:06:29And then in a more protracted conflict, other basing options like in Australia in the second
01:06:34island chain become more important.
01:06:36But immediate approval from Japan to use those bases, like within hours, is the most important
01:06:41thing.
01:06:42Yeah, I wouldn't disagree with that at all.
01:06:44The only thing I would add is the point about the duration of the conflict and the scope
01:06:48of it.
01:06:49If the duration of the conflict and the scope extends beyond the first island chain, second
01:06:53island chain, even Indian Ocean, then that necessarily will bring other players in.
01:06:57And if it gets to that level, I think we would be able to count on some of those players,
01:07:02including potentially the Europeans, to help as well.
01:07:08Thank you, Senator.
01:07:09Senator Rosen, you're next.
01:07:11Well, thank you, Chair Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen.
01:07:14Thank you for being here today for holding this hearing.
01:07:17Now, I want to talk about countering the PRC influence, of course, in the South Pacific.
01:07:22It's what we're talking about today because our economic security, our security relationships
01:07:27with the Pacific Island nations play a significant role in our ability to counter expanding PRC
01:07:32influence.
01:07:33It's particularly true for members of the Compacts of Free Association, or COFA, an
01:07:38agreement that serves as a bedrock of U.S. engagement with Palau, the Marshall Islands,
01:07:44and Micronesia.
01:07:45COFA is a mutually beneficial arrangement affording our military access to areas of
01:07:50immense strategic importance in exchange for U.S. assistance.
01:07:54Under COFA, USAID is tasked with leading disaster response efforts to all three island countries.
01:08:02But with USAID gutted, no other agency has the authority, the technical expertise, the
01:08:09capacity, or the resources to respond to a natural disaster in the Pacific.
01:08:15Disregarding our obligations under COFA potentially puts us in violation of our own agreement
01:08:21and will only cede ground to the PRC, which has been actively using, as we know, humanitarian
01:08:27assistance to expand its sphere of influence in the Pacific.
01:08:32So Dr. Cha, can you speak to the importance of the COFA agreement and USAID's presence
01:08:38in the region to U.S. national security?
01:08:41And can you expand on some of the consequences if the PRC were to displace us in the region?
01:08:49So thank you, Senator.
01:08:51I mean, I don't disagree with the way you've characterized the importance of the Pacific
01:08:56Island nations and also the vacuum that could be filled by China or is already being filled
01:09:01by China when U.S. assistance is not there, U.S. commercial support, all of these things.
01:09:09I mean, I think the Biden administration deserves credit for responding to this, but I mean,
01:09:15at the same time, unfortunately, it was a little too late because the Chinese had already
01:09:20made security agreements of that nature.
01:09:24You know, again, I'll go back to one of the points that I talked about in my testimony,
01:09:27which is in addition to the importance of things like RFA and VOA to compete in the
01:09:34information space so that there is a fair narrative of the United States and our interests
01:09:40in the region, the commercial support is also important.
01:09:44Again, China has used economic coercion against 18 governments and over 500 companies since
01:09:522008, heightened during Xi Jinping, of course.
01:09:55And you know, these Pacific Island nations, they're just easy prey for Chinese influence
01:10:02that way.
01:10:03So we need to be able to combat that as well.
01:10:05I want to expand a little bit upon that because it's also one of the only three Pacific Island
01:10:11nations to recognize Palau, excuse me, recognize Taiwan's independence.
01:10:18And so it's something I discussed with Palau's president when he and I met back in 2021.
01:10:23And so as a result, Palau is increasingly becoming a victim of PRC harassment.
01:10:29So to increase Palau's resiliency, USAID was supporting the development of an undersea
01:10:35cable system, which is vital for global communications, facilitating financial transactions for national
01:10:40security.
01:10:42This program is now halted as a part of the overall foreign assistance freeze.
01:10:46So I'm going to stick with you, Dr. Chott, and you talk about the importance of infrastructure
01:10:51development, undersea cable systems in the Pacific Islands.
01:10:56And what signal do you think we're sending if we're stopping this support to Palau and
01:11:02to others?
01:11:03Well, I mean, as we often say in government, you can't fight something with nothing.
01:11:08And so if we are moving away from, I mean, we can, of course, look to allies and partners
01:11:14like Australia and others to help, but if the United States is not supporting that,
01:11:19then it's just going to be a vacuum that's going to be filled by China or other actors
01:11:24that seek to undermine our interests there.
01:11:30I want to talk a little bit, Dr. Mastro, quickly about economic coercion by the PRC.
01:11:37We know that they're really spending a lot of money by supporting Philippines on energy
01:11:44security, infrastructure spending, pre-positioning near-key military installations, economic
01:11:49development programs.
01:11:50I'm going fast because my time is running out.
01:11:53Humanitarian assistance to demonstrate the value of what they're doing.
01:11:58Much of the work we've been doing is stopped.
01:12:00They're stepping in.
01:12:01So, Dr. Mastro, can you expand on some of the more prominent coercive tactics the PRC
01:12:07employs in the Indo-Pacific region?
01:12:11To the discussion, ma'am, that we were just having, it is, they have a three-pronged strategy,
01:12:16and one key part is exploitation or exploiting gaps where the United States is not present.
01:12:21They have more consulates and embassies in the region than we do.
01:12:23They have more elite visits than we do, and obviously, we've talked about the foreign
01:12:27aid and development assistance.
01:12:28So part of it, of course, is these positive inducements.
01:12:30When it comes to the coercion, the Chinese, when they have leverage, they use it every
01:12:35single time.
01:12:37We can't expect that if we step away, so we're no longer in a position to ensure freedom
01:12:41of navigation.
01:12:42So countries like the Philippines will have to trust that the Chinese will allow them
01:12:45to trade with the rest of the world, and while some might say, oh, the Chinese would never
01:12:50cut off that access, I think it's been pretty clear that when they're upset about something,
01:12:55and we're not even talking about foreign policy, military strategy, if you say or believe anything
01:13:00different about what happens domestically in China, then you are a target.
01:13:04Our allies and partners, I think, have learned and are learning more and more, if your strategy
01:13:08is to not upset Beijing, if that is your defense strategy, it's not going to work.
01:13:15Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
01:13:16Thank you, Senator.
01:13:17Senator Scott.
01:13:18All right.
01:13:19Thank you, Chairman Risch, Ranking Member Shaheen.
01:13:22Thank you for your testimony today.
01:13:24So first off, do you think that as China builds up their economy, there's a greater chance
01:13:29that they're going to use their military to invade Taiwan?
01:13:35Well, sir, I would focus on their military capabilities.
01:13:40We are not deterring China right now from taking Taiwan by force.
01:13:44What is deterring them is they haven't finalized their military modernization in particular,
01:13:48they haven't honed command and control and logistics.
01:13:50So if they have a crappy economy, if their economy falls apart, will they have less military
01:13:56assets?
01:13:58So far, sir, the size of their economy, they don't have to choose between guns and butter.
01:14:02And so it would really have to be such a decrease that you have widespread social instability.
01:14:06In that case, I think they turn inward.
01:14:08But otherwise, I think they have the resources to continue the modernization.
01:14:12What percentage of their economy is tied to the American consumer?
01:14:16Sorry, I'd have to get back to you on the specifics, but they are an export-driven economy,
01:14:21and their connection to the global economy is number one.
01:14:24If they believed trade with U.S. allies and partners would stop if they attacked Taiwan,
01:14:28they would never do it.
01:14:30So do you think it would be logical for any democracy, including the United States, for
01:14:37the people in these countries to stop buying Chinese products?
01:14:40Now, whether it would be easy, should we?
01:14:45So the way I think about it is if in times of peace, before we have this type of conflict,
01:14:50if we get rid of all of our leverage against the PRC, we don't have that economic deterrent
01:14:54in place.
01:14:55The Chinese are trying to diversify and to be less reliant on us for a reason.
01:15:00So I think those measures should be considered and should be in place in times of crisis,
01:15:05but potentially not something implemented in peacetime.
01:15:10But they're using their economy right now to build up their military.
01:15:16So wouldn't we be better off to stop buying anything from them today so they'll have less
01:15:21resources to modernize their military?
01:15:24Because of the fact it's too late.
01:15:25Once they have the military, they have it.
01:15:28I personally do not understand why anybody buys an American Chinese product.
01:15:32I mean, I've never understood it.
01:15:33When I came up here six years ago, 85% of the drones bought by the federal government
01:15:37were Chinese-made.
01:15:38I mean, that seems like stupidity.
01:15:40It only took six years to get that passed through the NDA.
01:15:44I mean, I don't know why we want to continue to build the Chinese economy.
01:15:49So do you guys intentionally go buy Chinese products?
01:15:54I would add that the technology, I think something that you highlighted is vitally important.
01:15:58If there's any U.S. product, technology, know-how that contributes to the lethality of the Chinese
01:16:04military, those absolutely need to be prevented from being exported.
01:16:08So you don't think it matters what their economy is doing?
01:16:10I mean, they didn't seem to have a very good economy back when their, our big military,
01:16:15when their economy was one-tenth the size.
01:16:19And they clearly couldn't threaten Taiwan when their economy was one-tenth the size.
01:16:23So I don't get why we, why we help them build up their economy.
01:16:27Does anybody else care?
01:16:32I think it's an extremely valid point.
01:16:34I think for often, for many years, we thought that our economic engagement would help shape
01:16:40and change China politically.
01:16:41It didn't.
01:16:42I think there are constituencies in the United States that do profit from the trade relationship
01:16:47with China, and they continue to be advocates for it.
01:16:51But, you know, I think we should look at things like revoking PNTR.
01:16:57I think we should look at strengthening export controls and outbound investment.
01:17:01It makes no sense to me that we would restrict the Chinese from investing in an entity in
01:17:05the United States that is engaged in developing some technology with military applications,
01:17:10but yet outbound investment can go invest in a Chinese entity that does the exact same
01:17:14research.
01:17:15It makes no sense at all.
01:17:16Dr. Cha, what do you think?
01:17:17Yeah, the only thing I'll add to that is that, you know, the other effect of the world's
01:17:23economic interaction with China is that it has caused many countries and allies of ours
01:17:28to self-censor.
01:17:30They stay away from saying things or taking actions that are in favor of the United States
01:17:34because they're worried they're going to get whacked by China with some sort of trade sanction,
01:17:37and all of a sudden they're going to stop sending tourists, or they're going to, they're
01:17:41going to stop, you know, importing bananas from the Philippines.
01:17:44I mean, there's a whole list of things that China does, basically weaponizing trade and
01:17:48interdependence.
01:17:49Yeah.
01:17:50Well, I don't, I don't, my time's up.
01:17:53I just don't, I don't get why we buy one product.
01:17:56I mean, our military is dependent on, on Chinese drugs.
01:17:59I mean, how are you going to change on a dime once, once they decide to invade Taiwan?
01:18:05Why we would ever rely on Chinese technology for anything like, like drones?
01:18:10It seems pretty, pretty foolish.
01:18:14Thank you, Senator Scott.
01:18:15Senator Shaheen.
01:18:17I have a few more questions before we close the panel out.
01:18:20First I'd like to go back, Mr. Shriver, I think to Senator Ricketts' question about
01:18:26the foreign military sales in the Philippines, and I would just like to point out for the
01:18:30record that $164 million of the $500 million in FMF for the Philippines is frozen under
01:18:37the cuts and the freezing of programs with the State Department.
01:18:42So that's troubling when we think about what we're hoping from the Philippines.
01:18:46But I wanted to, staying on the Philippines, the ICC has arrested former President Duterte
01:18:55on a, on a warrant for extrajudicial killings.
01:18:59Do you all have any view on how that's going to affect the upcoming presidential election
01:19:04in the Philippines and what that might mean for the U.S. relationship with the Philippines?
01:19:11Anybody have any thoughts about that?
01:19:20It's an excellent question and probably too soon to tell.
01:19:23I think there's a segment of the population that doesn't like to see a former president
01:19:28carted off in handcuffs, notwithstanding the actual things he authorized as president.
01:19:34And of course, this is a family affair.
01:19:36His daughter is the vice president and presumably leader of the Duterte faction in the next
01:19:43set of elections.
01:19:44So maybe I should ask it this way.
01:19:47How do we think, if she wins the next presidential election, how do we think that will affect
01:19:51the relationship with the U.S.?
01:19:54It's about, we've got about as good a partner as we could ever want in Marcos.
01:19:58So inevitably, it probably goes down.
01:20:02She is in many ways her father's daughter and thinks similarly about some of these issues
01:20:08like the alliance.
01:20:10But she's also shown streaks of independence and of course, she has a complicated relationship
01:20:15with her father in other ways.
01:20:17So I think it's difficult to say, but I think we have a window of opportunity now, given
01:20:23Marcos, which is why, as you point out, the things that are frozen, I think we should
01:20:27be moving with all due urgency while this window is open.
01:20:31Do you all agree with that assessment?
01:20:32Yes, ma'am.
01:20:33And if you would indulge me, given your question, I think it highlights the importance of having
01:20:39a really nuanced understanding of the domestic politics in the Philippines.
01:20:43We've already mentioned the seizure of some, the dissolution of some programs under this
01:20:47current administration, but also besides the Fulbrights, research funding under Minerva
01:20:51grants, for example, have all been ceased.
01:20:53And as a professor at a university, having people study these types of issues, we don't
01:20:58have PhD students anymore that we are encouraging to learn languages, to do these sorts of things
01:21:03because the funding has stopped.
01:21:05I agree.
01:21:06I think it's totally short-sighted and doesn't recognize how important soft power is to deterring
01:21:12conflict and aggression.
01:21:14Dr. Cha, did you want to add anything?
01:21:16I agree with that.
01:21:17I mean, it's not just a military alliance, it's a relationship, right?
01:21:21It's a political, it's a social relationship that crosses generations.
01:21:25And so, in all of these countries, all of these Indo-Pacific allies, as I mentioned
01:21:31in my testimony, it's about political engagement, not just military engagement, and in the case
01:21:35of the vice president, it's a very important role for the State Department and others in
01:21:40terms of diplomacy is early engagement and socializing not just the elite, but also the
01:21:46public about why these nine ECTA sites are important.
01:21:50I want to go back to the information space because you've mentioned, several of you have
01:21:56mentioned RFA and VOA, and we had a hearing here on China, I think it was our first hearing,
01:22:05and one of the people testifying pointed out that China spends over a billion dollars that
01:22:10we know of a year in the information space trying to influence information in countries
01:22:18in the Indo-Pacific, and much of it is disinformation and misinformation.
01:22:24So can you talk about what that means for us when we're not playing in this space at all?
01:22:30Sure.
01:22:31Senator, so recently I was asked, this was before the cuts, asked to speak to a group
01:22:37of Fulbright scholars who were going out to countries in Southeast Asia and Central Asia,
01:22:41places where there's a lot of Chinese media partnerships, and I told them that they should
01:22:45expect to go into an information environment in which everybody believes that the war in
01:22:50Ukraine was started by NATO, and they couldn't, they were Americans, they could not believe
01:22:55that people would think that, but this is what happens when you try to fight something
01:23:00with nothing, and so I think Oriana said it great when she said they spend eight times
01:23:06more on public diplomacy than we do, that about tells you who's dominating the information
01:23:11space.
01:23:12And that, again, that directly relates to the military.
01:23:15That is not sort of two or three steps removed from the military.
01:23:18That directly relates to political consensus on access, basing, and overflight.
01:23:23Yeah.
01:23:24I don't, anybody else want to add?
01:23:26Go ahead.
01:23:27Ma'am, if I can just add, Xi Jinping himself has been very clear that his top priority
01:23:31is to be the leader of the developing world.
01:23:34Before this administration came in, when I was providing recommendations and advice,
01:23:38I would say the United States hasn't really had a strategy towards the developing world
01:23:42in a long time, and that should be our number one priority, is enhancing and increasing
01:23:46spending in some of these areas.
01:23:48We look at some of this propaganda coming out of the CCP, and we think it's so heavy
01:23:51handed, who can possibly believe this?
01:23:54But after you spend time in a lot of these places and spend time in Beijing, I've been
01:23:58there for some of their top meetings of defense ministers with developing countries, and the
01:24:02rhetoric about, you know, the imperial United States, the colonial United States, I often
01:24:07have to remind everyone that the United States has never been a colonial power, it really
01:24:11resonates with a lot of these countries.
01:24:13And these are places, in some cases, no U.S. president has ever visited.
01:24:17Xi Jinping has gone to 70% of the poorest countries in places like Africa, Central Asia,
01:24:23where our leaders just don't go.
01:24:25And so, you know, it used to be the case that the Foreign Service could fit on one aircraft
01:24:29carrier.
01:24:30I wonder what it's going to look like in future years.
01:24:32But expanding our reach through those types of programs and departments is not only effective,
01:24:39as the other witnesses have highlighted, but it's actually, you know, relatively cheaper
01:24:43than trying to do it through military means.
01:24:45And I'm out of time, and we have to go vote.
01:24:48But I just have a final question, because I visited the Indo-Pacific last year, and
01:24:52one of the countries we visited was Vietnam.
01:24:55And I was amazed at how positive all the leaders we met with in Vietnam were about their strategic
01:25:02partnership with the United States, how they wanted to expand on that, the plans they had
01:25:07to grow the economy, and their willingness to stand up to China in ways that many of
01:25:14the other countries in the region were not.
01:25:17Does anybody want to speak to what opportunity we have with Vietnam?
01:25:21Mr. Schreiber.
01:25:23Thank you, Senator.
01:25:24We poll as a country, not political leaders or parties, but as a country, 94% favorable
01:25:31in Vietnam, which is just stunning, given how recent our conflict was.
01:25:36Now, the Chinese poll in single digits, and those two figures might be related, but that
01:25:42to me suggests there are definitely opportunities.
01:25:44When I was at the Pentagon, we did try to open things up.
01:25:47We had three aircraft carrier visits to Vietnam in about three and a half years.
01:25:52And so there are ways that we're expanding the relationship, we're helping them with
01:25:56the maritime domain awareness issues related to the Chinese incursions.
01:26:01But here's where I'll come back one more time to things that we have suspended.
01:26:06The dioxin remediation is absolutely critical, the legacy of war issues are absolutely critical
01:26:12enablers to the broader military and defense cooperation that we want.
01:26:16I've been to those sites, been to Bien Hoa, I've seen the local population, how much they
01:26:21appreciate it, because they've been concerned at the effects of Agent Orange.
01:26:27If we step away from that, these opportunities will close.
01:26:30I couldn't agree more, and thank you all very much for your testimony today.
01:26:36Well, thank you, Ben, a very interesting panel, and we really appreciate all of your views
01:26:42on these matters, critically important to people of the United States.
01:26:46I'm going to keep the record open for questions until tomorrow at the close of business, and
01:26:56I would ask if you get a question, if you would respond promptly.
01:26:59I know you're volunteering to this, but nonetheless, if you would help us in that regard.
01:27:04We really appreciate that, and again, thank you for your testimony.
01:27:07The hearing's adjourned.

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