National Transportation Safety Board Chair Jennifer Homendy provides an update on the investigation of the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapse.
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NewsTranscript
00:00Good afternoon, and thank you for joining us.
00:04Next week marks one year since the striking of the Dali Container Ship with the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore.
00:13The bridge subsequently collapsed into the Patapsco River, killing six construction crew members and injuring another,
00:20as well as one person on board the vessel.
00:25I want to once again extend our deepest sympathies to those who lost loved ones or were injured in this terrible tragedy.
00:37Today, we're issuing four urgent safety recommendations to bridge owners, the Federal Highway Administration,
00:44the United States Coast Guard, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
00:50Specifically, we're urging 30 owners of 68 bridges in 19 states
00:57to perform a vulnerability assessment of their bridge's risk of catastrophic collapse from a vessel collision,
01:05determine whether they need to implement countermeasures to reduce vulnerability,
01:11report their findings to the NTSB, and if warranted, implement a comprehensive risk reduction plan
01:20that includes, at a minimum, short- and long-term strategies to reduce the probability of a bridge collapse from a vessel collision.
01:30We're also urging the Federal Highway Administration, in coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
01:38to provide guidance and assistance to bridge owners on evaluating and reducing the risk of a bridge collapse from a vessel collision.
01:50As part of our investigation, we completed a vulnerability assessment of the Francis Scott Key Bridge ourselves
01:59to determine how susceptible it was to collapse from a vessel collision,
02:04taking into account engineering and shipping advances since the Key Bridge first opened in 1977.
02:12This vulnerability assessment is essentially a mathematical risk model
02:18used to determine how susceptible a bridge is to collapse from a vessel collision, and it's not new.
02:26The American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials, or AASHTO,
02:33developed and published the vulnerability assessment calculation for new bridges on the National Highway System in 1991
02:43in response to our investigation of the Sunshine Skyway bridge collapse in Tampa Bay, Florida.
02:51The State of Maryland was on AASHTO's Executive Committee at the time
02:56and served on AASHTO's Highway Subcommittee on Bridges and Structures,
03:02which developed those standards in 1991 and revised them in 2009.
03:09Included in the 1991 standards was a recommendation from AASHTO that all bridge owners
03:17conduct a vulnerability assessment of existing bridges to evaluate the risk of catastrophic collapse
03:24in the event of a vessel collision and take action.
03:30AASHTO reiterated that recommendation to states again in 2009,
03:35and I want to read the quote from the AASHTO guidance in 2009.
03:41All remaining existing bridges over navigable waterways with commercial barge and ship traffic
03:49should be evaluated using a vulnerability assessment in accordance with risk analysis procedures contained in this guide.
03:58The vulnerability assessments would meet NTSB recommendations to AASHTO, FHWA,
04:05and other federal agencies for improved bridge safety based on previous vessel collision accidents involving bridge failures.
04:13AASHTO continues on, based on the vulnerability assessment evaluations of existing bridges within the state system,
04:22a screening process based on the estimated annual frequency of collapse can be used to identify and rank high-risk bridges
04:31and to prioritize vulnerable structures for potential rehabilitation, retrofit,
04:37peer protection countermeasures, or replacement.
04:41The Maryland Transportation Authority never ran the calculation on the Key Bridge,
04:49and as of October 2024, they still haven't on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge.
04:56Had they ran the calculation on the Francis Scott Key Bridge,
05:01the MDTA would have been aware that the bridge was almost 30 times greater
05:10than the risk threshold AASHTO sets for critical essential bridges.
05:1730 times greater.
05:19And almost 15 times greater for Pier 17, which the DALI struck, as well as Pier 18.
05:28What's frustrating is, not only did MDTA fail to conduct the vulnerability assessment on the Key Bridge,
05:37they did not provide, nor were they able to provide, the NTSB with the data needed to conduct the assessment,
05:47including the characteristics of vessel traffic passing under the bridge,
05:52vessel transit speeds, vessel loading characteristics, waterway and navigable channel geometry,
06:00water depths, environmental conditions, bridge geometry, peer protection systems,
06:07and ultimate lateral capacity of the bridge piers.
06:11We asked them for that data. They didn't have it.
06:15We had to develop that data ourselves, with the help of our federal partners at the Federal Highway Administration.
06:23And I want to take a moment to thank the team at the Federal Highway Administration
06:29for all their assistance on this investigation.
06:33We conclude in our report that had the MDTA conducted a vulnerability assessment of the Key Bridge
06:40based on recent vessel traffic, the MDTA would have been able to proactively identify strategies
06:48to reduce the risk of a collapse and loss of lives associated with a vessel collision with the bridge.
06:57Like the Key Bridge, other bridges throughout the United States were designed before AASHTO's 1991 guidance.
07:06To understand the scope of that risk, we asked the Federal Highway Administration to identify bridges
07:14that cross navigable waterways and are used by ocean-going vessels like the DALI
07:21and gather information about protection devices in place for those bridges, like dolphins, like fender systems.
07:29We then narrowed that list based on when the bridge was built,
07:33whether it had a vertical clearance of at least 80 feet,
07:38and whether it had substructures such as piers in a waterway.
07:42We also evaluated vessel traffic transiting under the bridges.
07:47We repeated the same process for bridges owned by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
07:54And as a result, we identified 72 bridges in 19 states,
07:59managed by 30 bridge owners that were likely not designed and built to AASHTO's specifications.
08:07Owners of four of those bridges performed a recent vulnerability assessment
08:13and are either implementing a plan to reduce their bridge's vulnerability or will be doing so in the future.
08:20The remaining 68 bridges that have not undergone a vulnerability assessment
08:26based on recent vessel traffic have an unknown level of risk of collapse from a vessel collision,
08:35which is why we're recommending that those 30 bridge owners take action now.
08:41Frankly, we've been sounding the alarm on this since the tragedy occurred,
08:47and in testimony before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee last April.
08:52We need action.
08:55Public safety depends on it.
08:59So the 30 bridge owners who will receive our urgent recommendations are
09:04the Bay Area Toll Authority,
09:07Caltrans,
09:09the Golden Gate Bridge Highway and Transportation District,
09:12the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
09:15the Florida Department of Transportation,
09:18the Georgia Department of Transportation,
09:19Skyway Concession Company, LLC,
09:23the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development,
09:27the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad,
09:30the Maryland Transportation Authority,
09:33the Massachusetts Department of Transportation,
09:36the Mackinac Bridge Authority,
09:39the New Hampshire Department of Transportation,
09:42the Delaware River Port Authority,
09:44the New Jersey Turnpike Authority,
09:47MTA Bridges and Tunnels,
09:50the New York City Department of Transportation,
09:53the New York State Bridge Authority,
09:56the Ogdensburg Bridge and Port Authority,
09:59the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey,
10:02the Seaway International Bridge Corporation,
10:05the Thousand Islands Bridge Authority,
10:08the Ohio Department of Transportation,
10:11the Oregon Department of Transportation,
10:13the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission,
10:16the Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority,
10:19the Harris County Toll Road Authority,
10:22the Texas Department of Transportation,
10:25the Washington State Department of Transportation,
10:28and the Wisconsin Department of Transportation.
10:31Now, I want to emphasize,
10:34because we don't want to see headlines
10:37naming a bridge of being at risk of collapse
10:40or imminent risk of collapse.
10:41A risk level above the acceptable threshold
10:45doesn't mean a collapse from a vessel collision
10:49is an absolute certainty.
10:51Likewise, a bridge designed with a risk level
10:54below the acceptable threshold
10:57doesn't guarantee that a collapse from a vessel collision
11:00won't occur.
11:02What we are telling bridge owners
11:05is that they need to know the risk
11:08and determine what actions they need to take
11:11to ensure safety.
11:13Again, I want to reiterate our exact findings today
11:19and all four urgent safety recommendations verbatim.
11:23Finding number one,
11:25had the Maryland Transportation Authority
11:28conducted a vulnerability assessment
11:30of the Francis Scott Key Bridge
11:32based on recent vessel traffic,
11:34as recommended by the 1991 and 2009
11:38American Association of State Highway
11:41and Transportation Officials Guide Specifications,
11:44the MDTA would have been aware
11:47that this critical essential bridge
11:50was above the AASHTO threshold of risk
11:53for catastrophic collapse from a vessel collision
11:56when the Dali Collision occurred.
11:58Finding number two,
12:00had the Maryland Transportation Authority
12:03conducted a vulnerability assessment
12:05of the Francis Scott Key Bridge
12:06using the American Association of State Highway
12:09and Transportation Officials Method 2
12:12vulnerability assessment calculation,
12:15the MDTA would have had information
12:18to proactively identify strategies
12:21to reduce the risk of a collapse
12:24and loss of lives associated
12:26with a vessel collision with the bridge.
12:29Finding number three,
12:31the 30 owners of 68 bridges
12:33over navigable waterways
12:35frequented by ocean-going vessels
12:38are likely unaware
12:40of their bridge's risk
12:42of catastrophic collapse from a vessel collision
12:45and the potential need
12:47to implement countermeasures
12:49to reduce the bridge's vulnerability.
12:54Urgent recommendation one
12:56to the Federal Highway Administration.
12:59In coordination with the U.S. Coast Guard,
13:01and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
13:04establish an interdisciplinary team
13:07including representatives
13:09from the Federal Highway Administration,
13:11U.S. Coast Guard,
13:13and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
13:15and provide guidance
13:17and assistance to bridge owners
13:19on evaluating and reducing the risk
13:22of a bridge collapse from a vessel collision.
13:25Urgent recommendation number two,
13:27the U.S. Coast Guard
13:29and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
13:31the recipient of recommendation number two.
13:34Support the Federal Highway Administration
13:36in establishing an interdisciplinary team
13:40and provide guidance
13:42and assistance to bridge owners
13:44on evaluating and reducing the risk
13:46of a bridge collapse from a vessel collision.
13:49Urgent recommendation number three
13:51to the 30 bridge owners.
13:53Calculate the AASHTO method two,
13:56annual frequency of collapse
13:58for the bridges identified
13:59in appendix B of the report
14:02that we issued today
14:04for which you are responsible
14:06and inform the NTSB
14:08whether the probability of collapse
14:10is above the AASHTO threshold.
14:13If the calculations that you performed
14:15in response to the safety recommendation
14:18indicate that a bridge
14:20has an annual frequency of collapse
14:22greater than the AASHTO threshold,
14:25develop and implement
14:27a comprehensive risk reduction plan
14:29that includes at a minimum
14:31guidance and assistance
14:33from the Federal Highway Administration,
14:35U.S. Coast Guard,
14:37and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
14:39interdisciplinary team.
14:42And the fourth recommendation
14:45develop short and long-term strategies
14:48to reduce the probability
14:50of a potential bridge collapse
14:52from a vessel collision.
14:55Now a few things
14:57about the status of the investigation
14:59itself.
15:01We're releasing over 1,000 pages
15:04of investigative material
15:06in the public docket today,
15:08including our bridge factual report
15:11and some interviews.
15:13Next week, we intend to release
15:15the hazardous materials,
15:17meteorological,
15:19and survival factors factual reports,
15:22as well as a study conducted
15:24by our Office of Research and Engineering
15:26on vessel size increases
15:27and associated safety risk.
15:30In the next few weeks,
15:32we intend to publicly release
15:34the voyage data recorder
15:36audio transcripts
15:38and associated data.
15:40We're still finalizing
15:42the engineering, nautical operations,
15:44and anchorage factual reports.
15:46We'll then begin working
15:48on our analysis
15:50and developing our findings,
15:52our probable cause,
15:54and our safety recommendations
15:55with a final report
15:57released this fall.
15:59Now with that,
16:01I will take some questions.
16:03Please raise your hand.
16:05I'll call on you.
16:07Please state your name
16:09and your affiliation.
16:11My name is Jessica Babb.
16:13I'm with Fox 45 out of Baltimore.
16:15So I know you've said
16:17that the MDTA did not calculate
16:19these risk assessments
16:21on the Key Bridge.
16:23The Dolly was a sizable cargo ship.
16:25Could they have put measures in place
16:27you believe could have prevented this collapse?
16:29And if so, what types of measures
16:31would those have been?
16:33Yeah, so these bridge owners
16:35need to be looking at recent vessel traffic.
16:37Things have changed over time.
16:39Vessels have gotten bigger, heavier.
16:41At one point in the 1950s,
16:43we had vessels that had
16:45just 800 containers on them.
16:47Now we're talking 24,000 containers.
16:50So they need to take a look
16:52at specific measures
16:53that are included
16:55in the AASHTO guidance.
16:57So yes, MDTA would have known the risk
16:59and could have taken action
17:01to safeguard the Key Bridge.
17:03Do you think that collapse
17:05could have been prevented, though?
17:07Had they done that,
17:09the collapse could have been prevented.
17:11Yes?
17:13Chair Hamaday, it sounds like
17:15from what you're saying,
17:17these 68 bridges,
17:19the owners have not done
17:21these assessments.
17:23The vast majority of those bridges
17:25would be above
17:27the acceptable level of risk
17:29and need significant improvements?
17:31The question is whether
17:33the 30 bridge owners
17:35that were issuing these recommendations do.
17:37Whether we believe
17:39their risk assessment will show
17:41that they're above the AASHTO threshold.
17:43We don't know that.
17:45That is something that
17:47this is why we are urging
17:49those bridge owners to take action.
17:51We're hoping it's very few,
17:53but if they don't know that
17:55and they need to determine
17:57what their risk is
17:59and start to put in
18:01those protective measures if warranted.
18:03One thing I do want,
18:05back to your question
18:07on could they have taken action
18:09and would have prevented it,
18:11this is not new.
18:13MDTA could have done this evaluation
18:15numerous times over the past
18:17several decades.
18:19It was recommended by AASHTO in 1991.
18:21It was recommended by AASHTO in 2009.
18:23They were part of that subcommittee
18:25in issuing those recommendations
18:27and they especially
18:29should have looked
18:31at the change in vessel traffic
18:33certainly after the 2016 expansion
18:35of the Panama Canal.
18:37Yes.
18:39Thank you for taking my question.
18:41Phil Jakubuski from WBIL Radio in Baltimore.
18:43You talked about the process
18:45that they should have
18:47done these assessments.
18:49Were there warning letters
18:51to them?
18:53Can you talk about that?
18:55How did you keep tabs
18:57that this was not being done?
18:59So the question is
19:01the vulnerability assessments
19:03and how MDTA
19:05had not done
19:07these vulnerability assessments.
19:09It was a recommendation
19:11from AASHTO in 1991
19:13and again in 2009.
19:15As part of our investigation
19:17we asked had you done
19:19this vulnerability assessment
19:21we then asked
19:23are you doing this vulnerability assessment
19:25on the Chesapeake Bay Bridge?
19:27The answer is no.
19:29They have not.
19:31Yes, sir.
19:33You're making these recommendations.
19:35How do you follow up on that?
19:37I'm Alan Etter from WTOP here in Washington.
19:39Thank you, Alan.
19:41You've made these recommendations.
19:43What does the follow up look like?
19:45How can you ensure
19:47that these measures take place?
19:49The question is on the follow up
19:51on the recommendations.
19:53When we issue urgent recommendations
19:55we are saying
19:57there is a safety deficiency here,
19:59a potential safety risk
20:01and you need to take immediate action.
20:03So we will follow up
20:05with all of the bridge owners
20:07over time.
20:09We will follow up with Federal Highways.
20:11We had a briefing for Federal Highways today.
20:13I also called the State of Maryland
20:15to make sure they knew
20:17that we were issuing this
20:19as well as several others.
20:21We will follow up with them.
20:23That follows up on those recommendations
20:25and we'll do so.
20:27Ms. Hammond,
20:29I'm Kate Amara from WTOP in Baltimore.
20:31I am curious
20:33if the Chesapeake Bay Bridge
20:35in Maryland is on the list
20:37of the 68 bridges
20:39because I'm also wondering
20:41if so,
20:42could that be the only bridge
20:44of the 68 where the owners
20:46knew it was on the list
20:48because back in May
20:49the state specifically
20:51directed the MDTA
20:53to do short-term and long-term studies
20:55to upgrade the existing protection.
20:57So is the Bay Bridge on the list?
21:00Did they already know
21:02they were on this list
21:04and do they give you any explanation
21:06for why as of November
21:08the assessment still had not been conducted?
21:10Yeah, the question is
21:12is the Chesapeake Bay Bridge
21:14on the list
21:16of 68 bridges
21:17and its bridges and bridge spans?
21:19The answer is yes.
21:21The east and westbound
21:23portions of the bridge
21:25are on the list of 68.
21:28And then the question is
21:30about their vulnerability assessment
21:33and conducting
21:35the vulnerability assessment.
21:37We asked MDTA,
21:39are you doing it in writing
21:41as of October?
21:43They stated no.
21:45Certainly if they build
21:47a new bridge they will have to.
21:49But as of the existing bridge
21:51we know that they have not done
21:53that calculation.
21:55That vulnerability assessment
21:57takes a long time.
21:59There's no reason why they
22:01shouldn't have done it before now.
22:03It shouldn't take an urgent
22:05safety recommendation to get action
22:07and we expect that to be done now.
22:09And we'll follow up.
22:11Sure. Yes, sir.
22:13Adam Tuss, Channel 4 here in D.C.
22:15People have a hard time
22:17hearing what your advice
22:19would be to them
22:21if the safety risk
22:23is kind of unknown
22:25at this point in time.
22:27Yeah, the question is
22:29about concerns over safety
22:31and driving over the Bay Bridge.
22:33I also drive over the Bay Bridge
22:35at times.
22:37I would say the reason
22:39we are issuing
22:41urgent safety recommendations
22:43is we don't want
22:45this to occur.
22:47We don't want people
22:49to lose their speeds.
22:51And so what we are trying
22:53to do is prevent
22:55something in the future.
22:57That is always what we're
22:59trying to do in issuing
23:01our safety recommendations.
23:03In this case,
23:05they need to know the risk
23:07and take action.
23:09It doesn't mean there is
23:11a risk there.
23:13They just don't know right now.
23:15So they need to determine
23:17what drivers should take
23:19into consideration.
23:21Drivers have to make
23:23their own decisions,
23:25especially when it comes
23:27to their day-to-day travel.
23:29Yes, ma'am.
23:31Hi, Fredosa Stover
23:33with Fox News Channel.
23:35Have you spoken
23:37with the Maryland Governor
23:39Wes Moore about
23:41the challenges with MDTA?
23:43I have spoken with
23:45Governor Wes Moore
23:47and the MDTA throughout
23:49the investigation.
23:51They have gotten a lot
23:53of information from them.
23:55They didn't have
23:57the information to provide.
23:59So it wasn't that
24:01they were withholding
24:03the information,
24:04but they didn't have
24:06the data that needed
24:08to go into that calculation.
24:10Why that is is another issue.
24:12They should have had
24:14that data.
24:15We did the work,
24:17but they didn't have
24:19the data to go
24:21into that calculation.
24:23I don't know if they have
24:25changed any of their
24:27data collection systems
24:29and if they even have
24:31the data to have
24:32a full risk assessment
24:34for the Bay Bridge
24:36at this point.
24:38Does MDTA have
24:40the data to do
24:41a full risk assessment
24:43of the Chesapeake Bay Bridge?
24:45They've certainly
24:46made recommendations
24:48where we are
24:50urging Federal Highway
24:52Administration,
24:53the U.S. Coast Guard,
24:54and others to work
24:56with the states
24:57to help them do that.
24:59So hopefully
25:01they'll be able
25:02to take action.
25:03But this is a great
25:04question for MDTA
25:05on what they do
25:06have available
25:07for the Chesapeake Bay.
25:09Elizabeth Worthington
25:10from WAR2 News in Baltimore.
25:12You testified last spring
25:13in the Senate
25:14that after that
25:15it was recommended
25:16to the Coast Guard
25:17to evaluate
25:18peer protection systems
25:19in the context of
25:20the shipping traffic
25:21to the British Sea.
25:22But that was never done
25:23because the Coast Guard
25:24said at the time
25:25it didn't have the authority.
25:26Do they have the authority
25:27and are they doing that now?
25:29And that testimony
25:30was before
25:31House Transportation
25:32and Infrastructure Committee.
25:34Their authority,
25:35I think,
25:37I don't know
25:38the answer to their authority.
25:39We will get back
25:40to you on that.
25:42They did not have
25:43the authority at the time.
25:45The Highway Administration
25:46also currently
25:47doesn't have the authority
25:48to mandate
25:51that risk assessment
25:52and those changes
25:54for those older bridges
25:55prior to 1991.
25:57But what I did testify to
25:59at that time
26:00is that bridge owners
26:01need to take action now
26:02and not wait.
26:04Two more questions.
26:09So,
26:11kind of two questions.
26:13Were you surprised
26:14by these numbers?
26:15And then also,
26:17just to re-get at this,
26:18why are the assessments
26:19so important?
26:22Were we surprised
26:24by the numbers?
26:26I can say yes.
26:28We were very surprised
26:29that they were so high,
26:3130 times great,
26:33almost 30 times greater
26:35than the threshold
26:36that AASHTO sets
26:38and 15 times
26:41for Pier 17
26:43and Pier 18.
26:45That was a surprise
26:46to all of us.
26:48But, you know,
26:49it's something that MDTA
26:51could have known
26:52and should have known.
26:53And why is it important,
26:55you asked.
26:56It's important to understand risk
26:58so that you can take action now,
27:01implement short-term
27:03and long-term strategies
27:05to ensure public safety.
27:07Last question.
27:09So, we actually asked MDTA
27:10over the summer
27:11when we were doing a story
27:12for the AASHTO
27:13Frequency of Collapse
27:14calculations
27:15and MDTA replied,
27:17this is a direct quote from them,
27:18this specification on analysis
27:20for pier protection
27:21is used only when designing
27:22a new structure
27:23to determine
27:24if slash where
27:25pier protection is needed.
27:26Were they wrong on that?
27:28They might want to,
27:29were they,
27:30there was a quote
27:31somebody read
27:32about a response
27:33on pier protection
27:35and about how it applies
27:36to new bridges.
27:38That 1991,
27:39they might want to read
27:40their own guidance.
27:41They were on the AASHTO
27:42Executive Committee
27:43in 1991
27:44and they were on
27:45the subcommittee
27:46that developed
27:47the 1991 guidance
27:48and the 2009 update.
27:50It says very clearly
27:51on like page three,
27:53you should do
27:54the same calculation
27:55and risk assessment
27:56and put protective measures
27:57in place
27:59for your existing bridges
28:02before this guidance
28:03came out.
28:04So, there's no excuse.
28:05Thank you so much.