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00:00:00Thank you so much, Ian, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen.
00:00:05It's great to be here tonight.
00:00:07Great to be here at the German Marshall Fund and as you said, Ian, 10 years ago, almost
00:00:14exactly 10 years ago, when I started my tenure as Secretary General of NATO, the first platform,
00:00:22the first speech was actually delivered here at the German Marshall Fund.
00:00:26So it's great to be back and to end my tenure, giving a speech to the same institution and
00:00:35thank you so much for the excellent cooperation we have had over these years.
00:00:40Then as some of you may know, early 2014, when I was first approached and asked whether
00:00:52I was open to become the Secretary General of NATO, I did as I always do, I went to my
00:01:00father and asked for advice and he said, not so much happens at NATO.
00:01:10So he was not very enthusiastic about the idea of me going down there and having some
00:01:15boring years and I listened very carefully to him because he joined the Foreign Service
00:01:24in Norway in the 1950s.
00:01:27He was Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs and he attended more NATO
00:01:34meetings than almost any other Norwegian.
00:01:38And maybe he was right that NATO was traditionally quite static, but static, quiet, is absolutely
00:01:47not the right way to describe the alliance of the last decade.
00:01:53Since I took up my post as Secretary General in 2014, the world around us has changed profoundly.
00:02:02We have seen Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, the rise of ISIS, Russia's full-scale
00:02:10invasion of Ukraine, growing competition with China, the COVID pandemic, more sophisticated
00:02:19cyber attacks and the increasing impact on climate change on our security.
00:02:26So the list goes on.
00:02:30During my time as Secretary General, the relevance of NATO has been questioned.
00:02:39The alliance has been described as divided, obsolete and brain dead.
00:02:51But the reality is that NATO is strong, united and more important than ever.
00:03:01We have, over these 10 years, undergone the biggest transformation in a generation.
00:03:09We have strengthened our defences from having zero to tens of thousands of combat-ready
00:03:20NATO soldiers on our eastern flank, from thousands to half a million troops on high
00:03:27readiness, and from three to 23 Allies spending at least 2% of GDP on defence.
00:03:39We have strengthened NATO as an institution, doubling our common budget to ensure we can
00:03:48effectively deliver.
00:03:51And our family of Allies and partners has grown.
00:03:56Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland and Sweden joined our alliance.
00:04:04And Ukraine is closer to NATO than ever before.
00:04:10In 2014, we only provided marginal support to Ukraine.
00:04:16Now our support is massive.
00:04:19And NATO is coordinating the support through our new command in Germany.
00:04:27We have also broadened our partnerships in the Global South, deepened relations with
00:04:33countries in the Indo-Pacific, and NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels.
00:04:41I am proud to have served as NATO Secretary General and to have steered this Alliance
00:04:49through a decisive decade.
00:04:53As I look back at this incredible journey, let me reflect on five lessons that are key
00:05:01to NATO's continued success in the future.
00:05:07First, we have to be willing to pay the price for peace.
00:05:14The more money, the stronger our defences, the more effective our deterrence, the greater
00:05:22our security.
00:05:24Since 2014, spending across the Alliance has gone up substantially.
00:05:33All NATO Allies now invest at least 2% of GDP in defence or have plans to get there
00:05:41soon.
00:05:42And for the first time, total defence spending across Europe and Canada is above the 2% target.
00:05:52So the good news is that we have delivered on the pledge we made 10 years ago.
00:06:00But the bad news is that this is not longer enough.
00:06:07That is why NATO Allies have agreed to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence.
00:06:16And that is why we have agreed on robust defence plans with specific capability targets that
00:06:26outline what each Ally needs to provide in terms of weapons, forces and readiness for
00:06:34our security.
00:06:37To meet these agreed targets, Allies will have to spend significantly more than 2% of
00:06:45GDP on defence in the years to come.
00:06:49The second lesson is that freedom is more important than free trade.
00:06:57Not so long ago, many Allies believed that buying gas from Russia was purely a commercial
00:07:03matter.
00:07:04That was wrong.
00:07:07Russia used gas as a weapon to try to coerce us and to prevent us from supporting Ukraine.
00:07:15We must not make the same mistake with China.
00:07:21Depending on China's rare earth minerals, exporting advanced technologies and allowing
00:07:29foreign control over critical infrastructure weakens our resilience and creates risks.
00:07:37Of course, we will continue to engage with China.
00:07:41But we must not trade short-term economic interests for long-term security needs.
00:07:49At the same time, and this is important, security cannot be an excuse to introduce protection
00:07:58measures against friends and Allies.
00:08:03On the contrary, the more we limit trade with potential adversaries, the more important
00:08:10it is to preserve open economic relations among Allies and ourselves.
00:08:18Barriers and tariffs between our countries will increase costs, reduce quality and stifle
00:08:28innovation.
00:08:30This will undermine our security.
00:08:34Because it will undermine the strength of our economies.
00:08:38NATO prevailed during the Cold War, not least because we believed in open economies and
00:08:46competition between our countries.
00:08:48And remember that in Article 2 of our founding treaty, the Washington Treaty, it is stated
00:08:56clearly that we should encourage each other to strengthen our economic collaboration between
00:09:05Allies.
00:09:07So let's take this commitment seriously.
00:09:12Protectionism against Allies does not protect our security.
00:09:19The third lesson is that military strength is a prerequisite for dialogue.
00:09:28I know this from my time as Prime Minister of Norway.
00:09:33We have to speak to our neighbours, however difficult it might be.
00:09:39But dialogue only works when it is backed by strong defences.
00:09:45This is clearly demonstrated in Ukraine.
00:09:50We all want this war to end.
00:09:54The quickest way to end the war is to lose it.
00:09:59But that will not bring peace.
00:10:02It will bring Russian occupation.
00:10:06Today President Putin believes he can achieve his goals on the battlefield.
00:10:14And he believes that he can wait us out.
00:10:17That is why he continues to wage his brutal war.
00:10:25I do not believe that we can change Putin's mind.
00:10:31But I do believe that we can change his calculus.
00:10:36By giving Ukraine more weapons, we can make Putin realise he cannot get what he wants
00:10:44by force.
00:10:46And make it so costly that he will have to accept Ukraine has a sovereign democratic
00:10:53right to persist as a sovereign democratic nation.
00:10:58The paradox is that the more weapons for Ukraine we are able to deliver, the more likely
00:11:06it is that we can reach a peace and end to the war.
00:11:11And the more credible our long-term military support, the sooner the war will end.
00:11:20As President Zelensky has stated, Russia has to be part of future peace talks.
00:11:28The Minsk agreements after Russia's first invasion in 2014 did not bring peace.
00:11:37Any future deal must be backed by strong military support to Ukraine and credible security guarantees
00:11:45to ensure lasting peace.
00:11:48There can be no sustained security in Europe without a stable Ukraine.
00:11:55And no lasting security for Ukraine without NATO membership.
00:12:01NATO's door is open.
00:12:04Ukraine will join.
00:12:07Now to my fourth lesson.
00:12:12Military power has its limits.
00:12:17We saw this clearly in Afghanistan.
00:12:22Following the terrorist attacks on 9-11, it was right to go into Afghanistan.
00:12:29Our military intervention had a clear UN mandate and received broad political support across
00:12:37the Alliance.
00:12:39We degraded Al-Qaeda and prevented Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international
00:12:45terrorists.
00:12:47So our mission was not in vain.
00:12:50And I honour all those who made the ultimate sacrifice.
00:12:57But the Afghanistan mission lasted too long.
00:13:05When I arrived at NATO in 2014, the plan was to end our military presence in a couple of
00:13:13years and transition to a political partnership.
00:13:20But seven years later, we were still there with thousands of troops.
00:13:27What started as a focused counter-terrorism operation became a large-scale, nation-building
00:13:35mission.
00:13:37A democratic and united Afghanistan, with equal rights for all, was a worthy goal.
00:13:47But it was too ambitious.
00:13:51We saw the cost of mission creep.
00:13:54After 20 years, we were still not winning the war.
00:14:00The Taliban were gaining ground.
00:14:04And there were no united Afghan authorities that could take responsibility when we left.
00:14:13The fact that the Afghan government and the security forces collapsed so quickly demonstrated
00:14:20why it was right to leave.
00:14:25What should have been a stable and strong state structure was a house of cards.
00:14:36There was no reason to believe that staying another 20 years would have provided a different
00:14:43outcome.
00:14:46So the lesson learned is that the purpose of any future military operation outside NATO
00:14:53territory must be clearly defined, and we must be honest about what we can and what
00:15:01we cannot achieve.
00:15:05So to my fifth and final lesson, and the most important one, we must never take the bond
00:15:15between Europe and North America for granted.
00:15:20NATO is not written in stone.
00:15:23It is the result of deliberate choices and political will.
00:15:28We have heard voices on both sides of the Atlantic calling for America and Europe to
00:15:33part ways.
00:15:36Focusing on short-sighted national interests over longer-term cooperation will not serve
00:15:42us well.
00:15:44Isolationism will not keep anyone safe.
00:15:50We live in an interconnected world.
00:15:53Security challenges are too big and competition is too fierce for any country to go it alone.
00:16:01Investing in the transatlantic relationship is the only winning way forward.
00:16:12Europeans must understand without NATO there is no security for Europe.
00:16:18Eighty percent of NATO's defence spending comes from non-EU Allies, and it's not only
00:16:27about resources, it's also about geography.
00:16:32Without Turkey in the south, Norway in the north, and the US, Canada and United Kingdom
00:16:39in the west, it is impossible to envisage the security of the European continent.
00:16:47The transatlantic Alliance has served Europe well, paving the way for closer European integration,
00:16:54the reunification of Germany, and the spread of democracy and freedom throughout Central
00:17:00and Eastern Europe.
00:17:02It is a lesson of history that the Europeans must remember.
00:17:08The transatlantic Alliance has also served the EU as well.
00:17:14NATO's friends and Allies make indispensable contributions to US security and interests.
00:17:21NATO Allies have stood side by side with the US from Korea to Afghanistan, and have paid
00:17:28a high price.
00:17:30It is simply not true that Europeans are free riders.
00:17:36No other major power has as many friends and Allies as the United States.
00:17:42Any policy that seeks to undermine this is squandering one of America's greatest assets.
00:17:51Ladies and gentlemen, when I took up this job a decade ago, I could not have imagined
00:17:59how much our Alliance would transform, just as I cannot predict what lies ahead.
00:18:07But of this I am sure.
00:18:10While the challenges we face may change, the answer is the same.
00:18:16We are stronger and safer, Europe and North America, together in NATO.
00:18:24All right.
00:18:38Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General.
00:18:41Pleasure to be here.
00:18:42Great that we have the opportunity to have a, as Ian indicated, roughly 20-25 minutes
00:18:48for our conversation.
00:18:49And we will then open up to the public, also online.
00:18:53When you are watching us, you can send us your questions.
00:18:56We will see how many we will get in here.
00:19:02Before I pick up on a few of your remarks, just now this is one of the last occasions
00:19:09at least you are going to speak publicly in your capacity.
00:19:14So let me start with a question we are all interested in.
00:19:17How does it feel?
00:19:20It feels very strange.
00:19:21And to be honest, there are mixed feelings.
00:19:24I'm ready to go back to Norway.
00:19:26NATO will be in safe hands with the excellent new Secretary General, Mark Rutte.
00:19:30He has the experience, he has the knowledge.
00:19:33He has been the Prime Minister of a coalition government, so he knows how to make compromises,
00:19:36which is the key to become a good Secretary General of NATO.
00:19:40But he also has demonstrated the commitment to the transatlantic alliance and the support
00:19:47to Ukraine.
00:19:48So he knows how to compromise when compromises are needed, but he also knows how to not compromise
00:19:53and to not compromise on our core values.
00:19:55Now I'm not answering your question, because it's easier to speak about something else.
00:20:00How it feels?
00:20:01Well, I will miss NATO, I will miss Brussels, I will miss the people, but the beauty of
00:20:08being a politician for as many years as I have been is that I have stepped down many
00:20:12times before.
00:20:13I remember I stepped down as Minister of Finance back in 1997.
00:20:17I thought it was the end of the world, but it was not.
00:20:20And then I stepped down as Prime Minister in 2001, after two short years.
00:20:25And then I stepped down in 2013, and something nice has happened every time.
00:20:30So there is a bright future even for former Secretary Generals of NATO.
00:20:37You quoted famously your father, not much is going on at NATO, so things have changed
00:20:42a bit.
00:20:44So you quoted between obsolete and brain dead.
00:20:48So how difficult was it to navigate between those remarks, those times?
00:20:55I remember pretty well how NATO reacted then.
00:20:59Is it more now?
00:21:00Well, I think that the best way for NATO to prove that we are vigilant, we are alive,
00:21:06we are kicking, we are a strong alliance, is actually what you do.
00:21:10So instead of starting a discussion about these labels that was put on us, what we did
00:21:17prove that that was wrong.
00:21:19The reality is that we have seen the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence in
00:21:23a generation.
00:21:24In 2014, we had zero battle groups, zero NATO combat-ready troops, at least on bottom lines.
00:21:33And now we have thousands, 10 battle groups, and thousands of combat-ready troops.
00:21:41We have gone from a few thousand forces on high readiness to half a million.
00:21:48And again, defence spending going from three allies, the United Kingdom, United States
00:21:54and Greece, the only allies that were at 2%, even the Baltic countries, Poland, they were
00:22:00far below.
00:22:04So by doing what we have done, the support Ukraine, increasing our deterrence and defence,
00:22:10strengthening our cyber defences, everything we have done over these years, and then also
00:22:13four more members, if we were so bad, why would all these countries like to join?
00:22:19So I think just the action speaks louder than words.
00:22:22So instead of engaging in the discussion about these labels, we just demonstrated by what
00:22:29we did, that we are vigilant, strong and fit for the future.
00:22:34That sounds to me you are quite proud of what you have achieved during the last 10 years.
00:22:41Let me pick up on a few things you said and what you labelled as the most important lesson,
00:22:50this was the last one actually, we never can take the bond between US and NATO for granted.
00:22:58You said we have to invest into the transatlantic relationship, what does it mean specifically
00:23:04beyond the finances, or is it about the money, about expenditures, capabilities, what do
00:23:10you mean specifically?
00:23:12I mean both finances, capabilities, but also politically.
00:23:16On the finances, I think it has been absolutely fair of the United States to criticise European
00:23:21allies for not investing enough, and we have to remember that this has been a consistent
00:23:27message from presidents actually dating back to John F. Kennedy.
00:23:31It was President Obama that was the president when he actually made sure that we were able
00:23:38to agree at the NATO summit in Wales in 2014, the commitment to go to 2%.
00:23:46Then President Trump was also very clear on this message, as you may remember, and then
00:23:52President Biden has conveyed the same message.
00:23:54They have used different language, but the core message has been the same, and of course
00:23:58when I say invest in our transatlantic security, I mean that Europeans and Canada have to show
00:24:03that we are willing to carry our part of the burden, and the good news is that's exactly
00:24:08what the Europeans and Canada now are doing.
00:24:10But it's more than that, it's also to understand the political relationship, the idea that
00:24:17we have to be together, not create competing structures that will overlap and duplicate
00:24:24NATO.
00:24:26And then I mentioned one of the most important things in my speech, and I may repeat that
00:24:31just to make sure that you all understood it, was that one thing is to see the dangers
00:24:37of economic dependencies on potential adversaries, not to be dependent on Russian gas, or not
00:24:44to be too dependent on rare earth minerals for China, but a whole different thing is
00:24:52to introduce economic barriers against friends and allies.
00:24:55That's quite right, that was another point you mentioned, I wanted to ask...
00:24:58The point is that we invest in our transatlantic bonds, it's about defence budgets, but it's
00:25:02also about not creating competing structures, and it's about understanding that integrating
00:25:08our economies, but also with friends like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand,
00:25:13and others, will actually strengthen us, and the opposite will weaken us.
00:25:19So, that's important, that's investing in our relationship.
00:25:22That brings me to your first lesson you mentioned, we have to pay the price for peace, that goes
00:25:30in the same direction, I guess.
00:25:31I mean, I remember very well the discussions in my country, Germany, how difficult it was
00:25:37to come to 2%, you just said, that's the bare minimum, we have to go further.
00:25:43Besides the capabilities, do we have a benchmark in mind, a figure, that should be reached,
00:25:51and in what terms, do you think?
00:25:54Well, what we have agreed in NATO is, because in Wales in 2014, we agreed that we should
00:25:59strive to move towards 2%, so the way 2% was formulated was like a kind of ceiling, something
00:26:06we should strive to move towards.
00:26:09Then after some years, we realised that that was not enough, so then last year in Vilnius,
00:26:17we changed the language and said that 2% is the minimum, so we changed 2% from a ceiling
00:26:23to a floor.
00:26:25I stress this because what I don't like is people who leave an organisation and suddenly
00:26:30they say something totally different to what they have said all the years they have been
00:26:34there, there is a consistency between what I said now, and what I've been working for
00:26:38over these years, but I stress now even more the idea of, we need to go beyond 2%.
00:26:46But then the other thing is that we have agreed these new defence plans, and that's about
00:26:51specific capabilities, how many tanks, how many battleships, how much readiness, how
00:26:58much ammunition we should have in stocks and so on, it's very hard to put a price on this
00:27:03because, for instance, readiness depends on wages, national costs, so each and every
00:27:13ally has to estimate the cost, but it's obvious when you look at allies that it's significantly
00:27:19more than 2%, so I'm not able to give you two point something or three or something,
00:27:23but I'm only saying that when you look at the language minimum, and we compare that
00:27:28with the capability targets we have agreed, it's obvious that it's significantly more
00:27:32than 2%.
00:27:33I mean, some pay already more, that's quite clear.
00:27:35Yeah, yeah, yeah, many do, many, more and more allies pay.
00:27:37But how smoothly will this go?
00:27:39I mean, politicians always argue they have to, you know, they have to take account the
00:27:44public opinion, not only in Germany, but also in this country.
00:27:48How do you think the audience, the public should be convinced to spend more, maybe much
00:27:54more than 2%?
00:27:56So first of all, I would like to defend the politicians, they are not so bad, and they
00:28:06are right when they say this is difficult, and I have been a politician for decades,
00:28:10and I understand it's very easy to be in favour of more money for defence, that's the easiest
00:28:15thing in the world.
00:28:17The difficult thing is that if you use a billion more on defence, you have a billion less for
00:28:22something else.
00:28:23So the difficult thing is to say there is less for health, or less for education, or
00:28:27I increase taxes, or I borrow more.
00:28:31Because the problem is that many NATO allies, they now have a debt ratio which is at 100%
00:28:36of GDP or even above, meaning that with an interest rate of 4%, they pay twice as much
00:28:44in interest than they pay on defence, if they pay 2% on defence.
00:28:48So for many allies, the interest rates on the loans, the debts, is bigger than the defence
00:28:55budget, so it's not easy, you can always, not always, but many countries can always
00:28:59borrow, but borrow is not the answer for most allies.
00:29:04So therefore, you either have to increase taxes, not easy, or you have to cut on something
00:29:10else, not easy.
00:29:11Sure, or lose elections.
00:29:15But sometimes lose elections is the right thing to do.
00:29:19But you would recommend they should stay strong and convince the public, this is what I get
00:29:24now.
00:29:25I said this just anyway to convey to you and also listen, that I realise that this is difficult,
00:29:31but the task of me, Secretary General of NATO and of political leaders, is then to explain
00:29:35why this is necessary, why it's necessary to actually take some pain, to take those
00:29:41difficult decisions, to have this money for X and Y and Z, because nothing is more important
00:29:47than peace and security.
00:29:49Without ensuring peace and security, we will not succeed with anything else, with climate
00:29:53change or health or whatever it is.
00:29:57And the good news is that, Germany is an example, but also many other countries in Europe, is
00:30:01that not so many years ago, it was almost impossible to talk about 2%, now it is possible
00:30:07to talk about 2%.
00:30:08And not only possible to talk about 2%, but it's possible to do 2%.
00:30:14And that's because people have realised, the voters have realised that this is serious,
00:30:18this is a full-fledged war going on in our neighbourhood, and therefore there is a much
00:30:24higher awareness and willingness to actually, to take the burden of increased defence spending,
00:30:30even though it has consequences for all the budgets.
00:30:33Maybe we should add, meanwhile we have a war, unfortunately, on the borders of the European
00:30:38Union and NATO.
00:30:39Maybe that changed, unfortunately, for that reason, the consciousness.
00:30:44But that brings me to the point you also mentioned, military strength is a prerequisite of dialogue.
00:30:51You said something similar 10 years ago with GMF, when you had your first speech here.
00:30:58Completely different situation, but we had already something going on, 2014, concerning
00:31:04Ukraine and Russia at the time.
00:31:09Let me ask you, you said to a colleague in an interview with a colleague of mine from
00:31:11Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung last week, that you do regret that NATO did not more
00:31:19to prevent this war and to strengthen Ukraine.
00:31:25Remind us, why did that not happen?
00:31:28Was there no consensus, but there was also no bilateral agreements, I understand, that
00:31:33you would have, you know, been in favour for?
00:31:38I did something in that interview that I normally don't do, and that is that I answer hypothetical
00:31:43questions.
00:31:44And the question was, did we do anything wrong and what could we have done differently?
00:31:50So with all the caveats that to answer and to speculate about hypothetical situations
00:31:54is always risky, I would just say that I remember the period between 2014 and 2022 as a period
00:32:02where some Allies, and also actually I and some of the NATO leadership, we tried to convince
00:32:08Allies to provide more military support to Ukraine.
00:32:11That was not easy.
00:32:15Neither to get agreement as NATO, we did some capacity building, some training.
00:32:19Some Allies, United States, United Kingdom, and Canada actually, had some training activities.
00:32:25I remember one of my first visits to Ukraine, we visited Yavoriv, just outside Lviv, where
00:32:32we had some training activities.
00:32:33So Allies did something, but what we did was not big enough, not large enough to really
00:32:40make a difference.
00:32:42And the reason was, of course, that this was this idea that we could provoke Russia to
00:32:47be aggressive.
00:32:48Well, we didn't do so much, and Russia was very aggressive.
00:32:53So my lesson from that is that I think that if we had been earlier stronger in our support
00:33:03to Ukraine, at least the threshold for Russia to attack Ukraine would have been higher,
00:33:07and the cost for them would have been higher, and at some stage Russia must understand that
00:33:14the cost of continuing this war is too high, so they have to sit down and agree a lasting
00:33:20peace arrangement.
00:33:23So, well, my answer is that, yes, we could have done more, Allies and NATO.
00:33:30I think the reasons why we didn't do more, we did something, I know other countries did
00:33:35more than NATO, but we could have done even more, was part of that maybe Allies were not
00:33:40fully aware of the risks of a full-scale invasion, and partly, now we speak 2014, 15, 16, so
00:33:48we were very aware of that, like 21, but in the first years after 2014, and partly
00:33:54there was this idea that this could provoke, yeah.
00:34:00When we change perspective, some people might argue on another political spectrum, could
00:34:05have NATO done more to make sure that Russia isn't going the way also inside the country
00:34:15politically as it is going now?
00:34:17Because I'm also picking up on your speech 10 years ago, where you said, okay, we have
00:34:22to be strong, but there need to be dialogue that completely collapsed.
00:34:29Would you say that there was also kind of a mistake on NATO's side when we watch from
00:34:35this perspective?
00:34:38It is Russia that bears the responsibility for that the dialogue between NATO and Russia
00:34:45has broken down, because we really tried.
00:34:50We tried in 1990s, and we had some progress.
00:34:54We were able to agree this NATO-Russia Founding Act, kind of the framework for our dialogue.
00:35:00We established the NATO-Russia Council, and we had some activities together, and we had
00:35:06also progress bilaterally between the US and Russia on arms control, and I saw one part
00:35:12of that myself as a Prime Minister of Norway.
00:35:15We had a good work relationship, cooperation with Russia in the north on delimitation lines
00:35:21in the Barents Sea, on fisheries, energy, and many other things, vis-à-vis travel between
00:35:25the northern part of Norway and Russia.
00:35:30And I continue to believe that it was absolutely right to really try to create a better relationship
00:35:37with our neighbour, Russia, after the Cold War.
00:35:40The question is, and I don't think we're able to find a fixed date, but the question
00:35:43is when was it obvious that that didn't work?
00:35:47Even after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, we made an effort.
00:35:54We tried to improve our relationship with Russia, and as late as January 2022, when
00:36:01we knew that Russia was planning a full-scale invasion, we knew that they had built up all
00:36:05the forces and the intention of invading Ukraine, even then we met in the NATO-Russia
00:36:11Council to really try to make the last diplomatic efforts to prevent this war.
00:36:15So we have really tried to engage Russia politically and to develop the political dialogue.
00:36:21But of course, when they have a full-scale invasion of a neighbour, responsible for killing
00:36:26thousands of people, bombing cities, civilian infrastructure, then of course the room for
00:36:33meaningful dialogue has almost disappeared.
00:36:38Having said that, as President Zelensky has stated, at some stage there has to be some
00:36:45negotiations with Russia.
00:36:48And he has said that Russia needs to be part of a peace process, because with your enemies
00:36:54you need to find solutions.
00:36:56At the end of the day, you don't like them, you can think they are aggressive, but still
00:37:01you need to find.
00:37:02Under which preconditions?
00:37:03Make one example, please.
00:37:04What do you mean, which conditions?
00:37:06Negotiations with Russia?
00:37:07No, first of all, I think it's for Ukraine to decide what are acceptable conditions.
00:37:12Second, what I strongly believe is that President Putin has the ambition of controlling Ukraine.
00:37:21He doesn't recognise Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation, even though Russia has
00:37:25signed on that many times, including the Budapest Memorandum, where Ukraine gave up their nuclear
00:37:31weapons.
00:37:32Russia and many other countries signed on guarantees for the territorial integrity of
00:37:37Ukraine, violated that, and tried to take control of Ukraine.
00:37:42So I don't believe that President Putin would change his mind on Ukraine.
00:37:49But I think we can change his calculus, because there is a limit for how high price is willing
00:37:55to get that.
00:37:57And therefore, military support to Ukraine is not a guarantee, but it maximises the likelihood
00:38:04for convincing President Putin that he has to sit down and agree a peace arrangement
00:38:11with Ukraine, where Ukraine prevails as a sovereign independent nation.
00:38:15And then it's for Ukraine and Russia to negotiate.
00:38:18Our responsibility is to enable the Ukrainians to send that message that he cannot win on
00:38:23the battlefield, the price will be too high.
00:38:26And that's the first step, to agree some kind of arrangement.
00:38:30The second thing is that when that is agreed, it is important that that's the real end.
00:38:36Because you have to remember that the war didn't start in February 2022.
00:38:41The war started in 2014.
00:38:44Thousands of people have been killed from 2014 to February 2022.
00:38:49First Russia took Crimea.
00:38:50We said that was unacceptable.
00:38:52Then they waited for some months and they went into eastern Donbass, took eastern Donbass.
00:38:57We said that was unacceptable.
00:38:59Then we had the Minsk-1 agreement that ended the fighting.
00:39:02Then Russia, it lasted for some months, Russia violated the Minsk-1 delimitation line or
00:39:09ceasefire line, so it's a ceasefire line, and they moved the fronts further west.
00:39:17We had Minsk-2.
00:39:20That lasted for less than eight years.
00:39:23And then we had the full-scale invasion.
00:39:24Now maybe Minsk-3?
00:39:25Also, the thing is, we cannot have Minsk-3.
00:39:30This agreement has to be a credible agreement.
00:39:33So the question, since you cannot trust the signature of these people because they have
00:39:37broken their promises so many times, Budapest memorandum, Minsk-1 and Minsk-2, then we need
00:39:44something that underpins such a peace agreement.
00:39:48And that's two things.
00:39:49One is to arm the Ukrainians so they can deter future Russian aggression.
00:39:56Also, what we didn't do from 2014 to 2022 is significantly arming the Ukrainians.
00:40:05That must happen this time.
00:40:07What didn't happen between the Minsk agreements and 22 was that we didn't give enough weapons
00:40:11to Ukraine.
00:40:12This time we have to enable them to deter future Russian aggression.
00:40:16The other part is security guarantees.
00:40:20And then we can, again, discuss exactly how those security guarantees are formulated and
00:40:25the framework, but at the end of the day it has to be some kind of guarantees from the
00:40:30big NATO powers, the United States.
00:40:33And then that's NATO membership, Article 5.
00:40:36And therefore NATO membership is actually a means to get a lasting, credible peace in
00:40:41Ukraine.
00:40:42OK.
00:40:43Thank you for that point being made.
00:40:45Any follow-up questions from my side, but I would like to open this now for the public.
00:40:49So whoever, please introduce yourself briefly and ask your question.
00:40:55The gentleman in the first row.
00:40:59Kurt Geisler.
00:41:00I'm one of the guides in the House of European History.
00:41:02It was fascinating to listen to you.
00:41:05When Axel Wernhoff stopped as Swedish ambassador to NATO some months ago, I asked him the question,
00:41:12Axel, do you write a book now?
00:41:14Can I ask you the same question?
00:41:16Yeah, and I used to say no, but now I started to say yes.
00:41:22So I will, when I come back to Norway, I will start to work on something that may end up
00:41:30becoming a book, yes.
00:41:33So we have a journalist colleague, Lillie Bayer.
00:41:37Somebody has given me, sorry, we need a microphone.
00:41:43Thank you so much, Secretary General.
00:41:45I had a question on your last point on NATO membership for Ukraine.
00:41:50Even though there's a lot of rhetoric about this and a lot of expectations in Kiev, I
00:41:55think a lot of colleagues here would feel that within the alliance there's still a diversity
00:41:59of views about NATO's future membership and the timeline for that.
00:42:05So what would be your advice for the Allies moving forward?
00:42:09How can they handle these high expectations from Ukraine and avoid disappointments and
00:42:14confusion or the dynamics of Bucharest?
00:42:22While we are waiting for a final decision on an invitation for Ukraine to join, the
00:42:28most important thing we can do is to prepare them and to move them so close as possible
00:42:35to NATO membership.
00:42:36And that's exactly what we are doing.
00:42:39We have agreed this big package of working more closely with them to create what we call
00:42:46interoperability, to ensure that the Ukrainian forces are fully interoperable, have the same
00:42:50doctrine and standards as NATO.
00:42:53We have agreed the NATO command for providing support to Ukraine.
00:42:59That's also a way to ensure that we are fully coordinated and that while we help them to
00:43:04fight the war of today, also prepare for the future defence of Ukraine, we have removed
00:43:11the requirement for membership action plan before, you know, to join NATO.
00:43:15It was a kind of two-step process.
00:43:18First you were awarded or you achieved this membership action plan and then you had that
00:43:23for some years and then there was an invitation.
00:43:26We have removed that requirement, so the next step for them is invitation.
00:43:32And thirdly, we need to find a way to ensure that we create the political conditions for
00:43:41Allies to agree.
00:43:42And I think what you just spoke about, to create the framework for a process that can
00:43:46end the war, will also help us to move Ukraine towards membership and as I said, guarantees
00:43:54for that this is not Minsk tree, well, NATO membership can be part of that.
00:44:01Gentleman in the first row, please introduce yourself briefly.
00:44:08My name is Jacob Fischer.
00:44:09I used to work for the Council of Ministers of the European Union for almost four decades.
00:44:14First of all, thank to you for your eloquent speech and sound advice you give to us Europeans.
00:44:21Thank you for that.
00:44:23When the Russian Second War started in February 2022, I took Ukrainian refugees at home, there
00:44:31have been eight up to now, and we had strong and long discussions.
00:44:37And the main fear is that we in Europe want so dearly to have peace that we want Ukrainians
00:44:45to give up something so that there will be a second Munich 1938.
00:44:51That's their fear.
00:44:54My fear is that later on, China will do the same with Taiwan.
00:45:00And we in Europe do not want to defend that country, that we want to leave it to the United
00:45:06States.
00:45:07What are your views on this?
00:45:08Thank you so much.
00:45:09Again, I think it's important to distinguish between what kind of responsibilities we have.
00:45:20It is for the leadership and the people of Ukraine to decide what are acceptable conditions
00:45:26for an agreement.
00:45:28And that will be a difficult decision for them to take.
00:45:33And I will not in any way try to make that decision for them.
00:45:39What I can do and we can do, and NATO can do, is to put them in the strongest possible
00:45:45position when they are making that decision.
00:45:50And again, what we know with certainty is that the stronger they are militarily, the
00:45:56more likely it is that President Putin has to realise that he will not win on the battlefield.
00:46:02And I know that some are concerned, and the situation on the battlefield is difficult.
00:46:07But we have to remember where this war started.
00:46:09When the war started, most experts told us that Kiev would fall within days, and Ukraine
00:46:15within weeks.
00:46:16The Ukrainians have liberated 50% of the territory Russia occupied in the beginning of the war.
00:46:23They have been able to open up a corridor in the Black Sea, they sank the flagship Moscow
00:46:29and many other Russian ships, and they are inflicting heavy losses on the Russian forces.
00:46:35So Russia is paying a price.
00:46:39We must maximise that price to maximise the likelihood for Russia to change their calculus.
00:46:44We have a question from the lady in the second row.
00:46:49Maria Vassilou, Greek newspaper, Tanea.
00:46:52During your tenure, you have witnessed, you have experienced quite a few ups and downs
00:46:59in the Greek-Turkish relations.
00:47:03A few years ago, we reached a crucial point.
00:47:06I would like to ask you first, how did you navigate through those crucial moments?
00:47:11And secondly, if you were to draw a sixth lesson tailored to Greece and Turkey, what
00:47:17would you say?
00:47:20So first of all, Greek and Turkey are two highly valued and important NATO Allies.
00:47:29They contribute to our shared security, to our collective defence in different ways.
00:47:33And they both play an important role in NATO, and they are of course part of the decision-making
00:47:39we make on a daily basis.
00:47:44When there have been some differences and some challenges in the bilateral relationship,
00:47:52most of that has to be solved through bilateral dialogue, and I welcome every time there are
00:47:57meetings, dialogue between the two countries to address these differences.
00:48:02Second, NATO has played, and I guess also in the future will be ready to play, a role
00:48:07as a platform to help to facilitate dialogue and to address the differences.
00:48:13And we have done that at several stages.
00:48:17First to address the risk of incidents over the Aegean Sea, at sea and in the air.
00:48:27We have some military-military lines, also structures that have been used to prevent
00:48:34any incidents, and NATO should continue to do that.
00:48:42I don't have a sixth lesson, but I just believe that Allies should be friends.
00:48:49Lady there in the third row, I think.
00:48:52We need a microphone there.
00:48:55Hi, thank you very much for providing your insights so succinctly and easily for us to
00:49:00take with us.
00:49:02My question is about the European Union and its increased focus and efforts when it comes
00:49:07to defence, culminating in appointing a defence commissioner just a few days ago.
00:49:12So I'm curious, with a structure like that, do you see any clear synergies, or would they
00:49:16rather be competing structures, as a lot of the European countries are also NATO countries?
00:49:21Thank you very much.
00:49:24So I welcome more EU efforts on defence, as long as they are done in a way that doesn't
00:49:32duplicate or compete with NATO.
00:49:35And there is a lot EU can do, and I read that the new commissioner's main task was,
00:49:42for instance, to address the fragmentation of the European defence industry, and that's
00:49:45extremely important, because the reality is that the European defence industry is not
00:49:51as competitive as it should be, because it's already fragmented, and that increases costs,
00:49:58and by increasing costs, we are getting less weapons, ammunition for the budgets we have
00:50:04available.
00:50:05And I think EU has the instruments to address that fragmentation.
00:50:12But what EU should not do is to start to build alternative defence structures.
00:50:20For instance, an intervention force, we have the NATO intervention force, and every time
00:50:26European allies have asked for help, we are there, Bosnia or Kosovo or elsewhere.
00:50:32So I don't understand why there is a need for a different competing intervention force,
00:50:40not least also because that will require, to be any meaningful force, command and control.
00:50:46And the backbone of NATO is command and control.
00:50:50And I'm not revealing a big secret that, you know, NATO's command structure is very impressive,
00:50:55very strong, but we struggle a bit to man all the positions.
00:50:59So it will be a bit strange if the same countries are not able to send as many officers to our
00:51:05command structure as they should, are starting to build an alternative structure.
00:51:08Also, defence planning, I've seen some language indicating that the EU should start to agree
00:51:16capability targets.
00:51:20Countries can only have one set of capability targets, cannot have two.
00:51:25That's NATO's responsibility, also because we represent 100% of NATO's strength.
00:51:30The EU is 20%.
00:51:32So the 20% cannot define what 100% should do on capability targets or on standards.
00:51:41A key responsibility to NATO is to have standards.
00:51:45And that's, one thing is about the diameter of the artillery shells, but you know, when
00:51:49you speak about cyber space, then standards is extremely important and very complicated.
00:51:57So on these areas, it has to be one set of standards, one set of capability targets,
00:52:02one command structure, and that's NATO.
00:52:05But they have assured me many times that the plan is not to create competing structures,
00:52:11not to start parallel defence planning processes or capability targets, but I really wish EU
00:52:18all the best in our common defragmentation, because that's adding the costs.
00:52:24Having said that, I think we should mention that a lot happened during the last 10 years
00:52:29between EU and NATO.
00:52:30I mean, there's a level of cooperation, I think, that hasn't been the case 10 years
00:52:35ago.
00:52:36So we have a question in the last row here.
00:52:37The gentleman.
00:52:38Hi.
00:52:39Thanks very much.
00:52:40Mark Czapczyk at GMF and at Comintern Berlin.
00:52:41Thanks, first of all, for your great remarks.
00:52:44I have two related questions about Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
00:52:49First in the run-up to the war, arguably there was an intelligence failure in Western Europe,
00:52:52and my question is whether you think the intelligence capabilities in some of the key European capitals
00:52:57have improved over the past two and a half years, either by way of assets or by way of
00:53:02interpretation and analysing intelligence?
00:53:06And prospectively, how do you expect this war to evolve?
00:53:10Something like the Polish foreign minister, Radek Sikorski, says that it might continue
00:53:14for another 10 years, which might entail millions of casualties on both sides, tens of thousands
00:53:20if not hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties, billions if not trillions of euros in terms
00:53:25of costs.
00:53:26Do you expect this to go on for another 10 years?
00:53:29And then, you know, in the best-case scenario where Ukraine can actually prevail, what does
00:53:35that mean on the Russian side?
00:53:37Who is in the Kremlin?
00:53:39What terms did they negotiate with Ukraine?
00:53:42So first, on intelligence, I think we need to remember that we have extreme precise information
00:53:49about the invasion.
00:53:52We predicted it exactly as it happened, and not only had we intelligence in NATO predicting
00:53:58the invasion, but we did something we normally don't do.
00:54:02We shared the intelligence publicly.
00:54:05So there were public statements in the media in the autumn of 2021 stating clearly that
00:54:11Russia now was not only building up the capacity, but also had the intention of invading.
00:54:17And we need to understand that it's normally easier to identify capacity than to identify
00:54:27intention.
00:54:29And among the intelligence services, I think it was a very broad agreement about the number
00:54:35of tactical battle groups and tanks and planes and soldiers the Russians had around Ukraine,
00:54:42because then you count.
00:54:44It's harder to know exactly what is the intention, and it is the combination of capacity and
00:54:49intention that really gives you the precise picture.
00:54:52But the US, the UK, and NATO, we had the clear picture that we had the capacity, but
00:55:01also the intention of Russia to invade.
00:55:03So this was something that, and when the invasion happened, there was no surprise whatsoever.
00:55:10We were shocked, but not surprised.
00:55:12And therefore, we were well prepared.
00:55:14On the morning of the invasion, we did actually what we had planned for and trained for.
00:55:20That was to activate the NATO's defence plans, meaning giving our Supreme Allied Command,
00:55:24SACEUR, more authority to move more forces to the Eastern Part of the Alliance, to send
00:55:28a clear message to Moscow that don't try to attack a NATO ally, and we stepped up the
00:55:32support to Ukraine.
00:55:36Then you are right, and I will be careful commenting too much on that, but it has been
00:55:39publicly and also commented by the leadership in some European NATO allies that they saw
00:55:46the capacity, but they didn't take fully into account the intentions.
00:55:54They didn't share their views on intentions.
00:55:58I will not answer for them.
00:56:00I would just say that NATO and the majority of NATO allies, there were absolutely no doubt.
00:56:11This is a story of a long-predicted war or invasion that happened in February 2022.
00:56:18Then let me add that we had precise information in the fall of 21, months ahead.
00:56:24But in many ways, we have actually prepared for this since 2014.
00:56:30I'm not saying that when I came to NATO in October 2014 that I knew with certainty that
00:56:35Russia was going to have a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but we knew that Russia
00:56:43was willing to use military force against Ukraine.
00:56:46We knew that they were threatening Ukraine, but also other countries in Europe.
00:56:51That's the reason why we started the big military build-up.
00:56:54That's the reason why we were so focused on 2%.
00:56:56They called me, I was travelling around asking for more defence spending, they called me
00:56:59Mr 2%.
00:57:00It's not a compliment at that time.
00:57:05And that's the reason why we started to scale up, why we decided in 2016 at the Warsaw Summit,
00:57:09long before 22, also in the full-scale invasion, to have battle groups in the Eastern part
00:57:14of the Alliance.
00:57:15So we started the preparations for an eventuality like this in 2014.
00:57:21We knew in the fall of 21 what was going to happen, and we were very prepared when it
00:57:26happened.
00:57:27Okay.
00:57:28Thanks so much for your questions.
00:57:29I'm afraid we have to come slowly to a conclusion here.
00:57:33Before I hand over to Ian, maybe I'm allowed to ask at least two of my remaining questions.
00:57:41I would ask you to be very briefly, one, what's your biggest, your most important advice to
00:57:47Mr Rutte when you hand over on October 1st?
00:57:52So I will not give him advice, and especially not publicly.
00:57:56So if he calls me and asks for advice, I will give advice.
00:58:00But I have so big trust and so great trust and confidence in him, and we two have known
00:58:06each other for many years.
00:58:07We were Prime Ministers together.
00:58:08So we met for the first time around the NATO table when he was new Prime Minister, and
00:58:13I was starting to become a bit old Prime Minister in 2010 at the Lisbon Summit, also Prime Minister
00:58:21of Norway, Prime Minister of the Netherlands.
00:58:22And then we have worked for 10 years, doing my tenure here at NATO, and he has the qualities,
00:58:28the experience to really do this job in an excellent way.
00:58:32So no advice, unless he...
00:58:34Maybe keep riding your bicycle?
00:58:36Yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:58:38How he move around in Brussels, I think he can decide that himself.
00:58:43So no, he's a great man, that would be excellent, but of course the biggest task would be to
00:58:48keep 32 Allies together.
00:58:51It's a big family, a great family, but sometimes what is a challenge to keep them all happy
00:58:56at the same time.
00:58:57Okay, last question concerning your own future.
00:59:02You said you will move back to Oslo probably.
00:59:05There were not only rumours, but some reports last week that you are going to be...
00:59:09And I'm sorry, I have to ask this as a German journalist.
00:59:13There were some rumours and some reports that you are going to be the next chair of the
00:59:18Munich Security Conference.
00:59:21I'm not expecting a confirmation, maybe.
00:59:24The question, why do you ask that?
00:59:28Actually, my question was much longer.
00:59:30I wanted to talk to you about the future of the Munich Security Conference and which priorities
00:59:35the next chair maybe should have.
00:59:39The active chair said we should open it even more up to the global south, for instance.
00:59:45Any constructive idea for the future of the conference, no matter if you are going to
00:59:50be the next chair or not?
00:59:51I didn't give my lieutenant-advice, I've not given advice to the Munich Security Conference.
00:59:56To be honest, I will not...
00:59:59I'm still responsible for NATO a couple of more weeks.
01:00:02My focus is on that.
01:00:04There's a full-fledged war going on in Ukraine.
01:00:06I'm going to New York to meet many leaders there to try to convince them and to urge
01:00:11for more support for Ukraine.
01:00:13That's my task, that's my focus now.
01:00:15So I will not speak about what I will do after NATO, as long as in NATO, and then when
01:00:19I leave NATO, maybe you can ask me again.
01:00:22Okay.
01:00:23Anyway, all the best for your future, Mr. Secretary General.
01:00:26Thank you so much for the conversation.