Is the most popular app in the world working for the Chinese government? Episode 2: Under Donald Trump’s mandate, Chinese tech-giant Huawei is accused of spying. This marks a turning point in Sino-American relations and TikTok is drawn into an economic confrontation between the two countries.
Categoria
😹
DiversãoTranscrição
00:00Tiktok is becoming one of the most popular applications in the world.
00:27Since 2020, it will be the main competitor of the only social networks that existed until then, those of the Silicon Valley.
00:36In becoming this major rival, Tiktok will exacerbate the confrontation between China and the United States.
00:47How is the American power going to riposte?
00:50Will it reduce the famous Chinese social network to better oppose Pekin and set up its supremacy?
00:59To discover it, we need to go back to the very beginning of the first President Trump's first mandate.
01:06A time where Tiktok does not yet have any concern.
01:11But this will not last.
01:14I want to tell the world community that we will always put America's interests first.
01:20America will no longer settle for anything less than the best.
01:25America will not visit both people in Cuba.
02:47Depuis son arrivée au pouvoir, presque un an plus tôt, le président américain est confronté à la formidable montée en puissance de la technologie chinoise.
02:55Une nouvelle application de divertissement est en train de déferler sur les États-Unis, comme sur le reste du monde.
03:05Elle s'appelle TikTok.
03:06Ce succès est à l'image des nouvelles ambitions de Xi Jinping.
03:14Celui que beaucoup considèrent comme le nouveau Mao a décidé de faire de son pays la première puissance numérique et donc économique d'ici 2030, contestant l'hégémonie des États-Unis.
03:56C'est vraiment différent.
03:56Sous-titrage Société Radio-Canada
04:26C'est la nuit, c'était absolument fantastique.
04:31Notre dinner était plus loin de ça.
04:34Derrière les sourires et les flatteries propres aux visites diplomatiques, l'ancien mania de l'immobilier a fixé la ligne de conduite de son administration.
04:56Pékin n'est plus un partenaire.
04:58Il est désormais un concurrent, voire un véritable adversaire.
05:06C'est alors qu'une surprenante affaire d'espionnage, impliquant justement une entreprise chinoise, fait irruption aux États-Unis.
05:15New warnings are emerging about the potential threat to American nuclear weapons posed by Chinese cell phone technology from Huawei.
05:23Cette société, du nom de Huawei, est un géant.
05:32Téléphone portable, réseau, IA, cloud, big data.
05:37Présente partout dans le monde, elle a bâti un véritable empire dans les télécommunications.
05:41L'homme à l'origine de cette révélation s'appelle Brendan Carr.
05:53Il est commissaire à la Federal Communication Commission, une autorité indépendante.
05:58À ce titre, il a la haute main sur l'ensemble de la politique américaine en matière de télécommunications.
06:07Hopefully, c'est the only take.
06:12Take one and only.
06:14A couple of years ago, I was up in Malmstrom Air Force Base, which is up in Great Falls, Montana.
06:24There's nothing up there except Wheatfield, Open Land,
06:31and ICBM missile silos that are dotted all throughout Malmstrom Air Force Base.
06:37And up there, we found that there was high-power, high-performance Huawei gear
06:43that was on all of these cell phone towers throughout that area.
06:48That didn't really make sense in terms of having that sophisticated level of technology
06:53in an area that had nothing up there except those ICBM missile fields.
06:59That was one of the red flags that we saw early on with Huawei.
07:03Chinese ICBM equipment in general can be used to spy on American citizens,
07:11surveil sensitive locations, military sites, things like that,
07:16but also that can lead to some form of sabotage.
07:19The US attention has been in all of the areas where it's greatly exposed
07:25to Chinese equipment, to Chinese services,
07:27and where it needs to unwind those critical dependencies.
07:30These Chinese companies don't only worry about the United States.
07:40In May 2019, in Prague, there is a international conference
07:44dedicated to the installation of telecommunications networks
07:48of the last generation, the famous 5G,
07:52which Huawei wants to be one of the main operators throughout the world.
07:57Yes, there is a threat, a very real, sustained, and variable threat.
08:04So it matters that we confront fear and promote rational risk management.
08:10We need to change the way we think about security and cyber.
08:14To understand that security of 5G is not just about cell phones or several companies.
08:21In addition to attacks by criminals, we see increasingly
08:25the use of malicious cyber activities by state actors.
08:37Quelques jours après cette conférence, le président Trump passe à l'action.
08:41We convinced many countries, many countries,
08:47and I did this myself, for the most part,
08:49not to use Huawei,
08:52because we think it's an unsafe security risk.
08:56It's a big security risk.
08:58I talked many countries out of using it.
09:00If they want to do business with us, they can't use it.
09:02That's the basic idea, this idea of clean networks,
09:09that you want to purge U.S. critical infrastructure,
09:12not only U.S., but also partner critical infrastructure,
09:15of Chinese telecom equipment, ICT equipment in general.
09:20And that is something that has been carried through
09:22during the Biden administration,
09:24and we'll continue on into the next.
09:25You can choose the buzzword of the day,
09:48whether it's decoupling or de-risking.
09:50The idea is that certain linkages need to be unwound.
10:00And that is what's happening.
10:03So yes, this is a form of decoupling.
10:05And we're not just talking telecom infrastructure.
10:09Semiconductor controls, for example, have been a major focus.
10:13Now we're just in this more expansive territory
10:16of governing data flows, right?
10:19Not just the data flows, but the internet plumbing
10:21that enables the movement of data flows across borders.
10:27We should also say from the Chinese perspective,
10:30I mean, Xi Jinping had pursued a policy
10:31made in China, you know, 2025.
10:35And then, you know, increasingly looking at
10:37how can China be less dependent
10:39on the United States particularly.
10:41So China also has, comes to the same conclusion
10:44that they need to de-risk or decouple.
10:49Donald Trump's question is asked to say,
10:51now that the economic economy with Pékin
10:59is becoming secure, so geopolitical,
11:02what do you think of TikTok,
11:04who stops to seduce new users to the United States?
11:08Is it afraid of a new Huawei?
11:11That would mean that the social network,
11:13apart from being a global enterprise,
11:15would not have broken up with the Chinese regime?
11:22The former president of the Google administration,
11:24Jacob Helberg, invited him to debate in June 2020
11:27in publishing in the very renowned foreign policy
11:31an article in the title of the title
11:32I realized that a pervasive feature of international politics
11:43was that authoritarian adversaries were increasingly using
11:46commercial civilian platforms against democracies.
11:50But that the current public debate
11:52wasn't appropriately capturing the dynamics at work.
11:55The media was very focused on Russia,
12:00but China, on the hardware side,
12:03was increasingly using its influence
12:05in order to advance its geopolitical interests.
12:14I try to focus on the climate of the era,
12:18not the weather of the day.
12:20So I talk to policymakers and technology leaders
12:24about big picture trends.
12:27In each instance, I made the case
12:29that TikTok amounted to a national security threat.
12:37Le nouveau lobbyiste partage la détermination
12:40de l'administration Trump,
12:42qui veut tirer au clair la réalité des liens
12:44entre TikTok et sa maison-mère,
12:46Bidens, et donc Pékin.
12:50One of the great difficulties
12:54that researchers have
12:55when looking into TikTok
12:57is that it's essentially a black box.
12:59And the temptation
13:00for the Chinese Communist Party,
13:03which holds enormous leverage
13:05over ByteDance,
13:06is to put their thumb on the scale.
13:11There's not a meaningful distinction
13:12between ByteDance and TikTok.
13:14Very complicated corporate structure
13:16that nobody understands.
13:20Ancien ingénieur chez Google,
13:23Patrick Spaulding Ryan
13:24a travaillé chez TikTok
13:25entre 2020 et 2022.
13:28It's not really clear to anybody
13:33what their mission is,
13:34whether there's a specific ByteDance mission
13:36or a specific TikTok mission
13:37or even the roles and responsibilities
13:39that employees are supposed to have
13:40with regard to other products.
13:42And so it's confusing to you,
13:44it's confusing to employees as well.
13:47So I was in the engineering group
13:48and in a role designing strategy.
13:53In that particular department,
13:55which reports all the way up to China,
13:57it's a very heavy Chinese culture.
14:00A lot of the engineers are Chinese.
14:04In fact, I was the most senior non-Chinese person
14:09in that role, for sure.
14:10It is pretty wild to see such like a big office space
14:28in the US being predominantly Chinese
14:31and just employing Chinese software engineers.
14:35Some of them are transferred to the US
14:37from ByteDance China offices.
14:41Some of them are Chinese nationals
14:43studying or working in the US
14:45hired by the company.
14:48Hey, good morning, guys.
14:49My name's Kevin,
14:50and this is my day in life
14:51as a software engineer on TikTok.
14:52It's almost like an enclave of Chinese people.
15:00And according to my sources,
15:02they have meetings with the Chinese staff all the time.
15:07Sometimes within their work meetings
15:10or their work documents,
15:12they would just even switch to Mandarin to communicate.
15:18Cette culture d'entreprise chinoise
15:21est aussi omniprésente
15:23dans certaines méthodes de travail.
15:30Journaliste d'investigation au magazine Fortune,
15:34Alexandra Sternlicht a enquêté
15:36sur la spécificité d'un outil bureautique
15:39utilisé par les salariés de TikTok
15:41ici, aux Etats-Unis.
15:43Le système LARC,
15:45une création de ByteDance.
15:51LARC is basically a super app.
15:55It's where all TikTok employees communicate.
15:58So they have messaging,
15:59they have video,
16:00they have workflows.
16:01Meeting time?
16:02LARC Meetings provides easy
16:04but powerful content sharing capabilities.
16:06But in China,
16:08it's called Feishu.
16:11And my source tells me
16:14that LARC and Feishu
16:16are basically identical.
16:17So Feishu,
16:19the product,
16:21came up with a non-China brand
16:24called LARC.
16:26Okay?
16:27And it's very similar
16:28to what happened
16:28in the case of TikTok
16:30and Douyin.
16:32And it has two names.
16:33Like everything you've seen here,
16:34it's a little confusing,
16:35but it has two different names.
16:36It has LARC as a name
16:37and Feishu as a name.
16:39Here's what's important.
16:40All of that infrastructure,
16:41all of the Feishu infrastructure
16:43is based in China.
16:45And it's a really interesting problem
16:46because the ByteDance executives
16:49won't admit it.
16:50But it's incredibly obvious that it is.
16:55So that means that any user data
16:58that's shared on LARC
17:00could potentially be accessed
17:02by its Chinese parent
17:05and people in China,
17:07which we don't have oversight of.
17:08So if TikTok employees
17:12are trying to solve
17:14some sort of issue
17:15involving a user,
17:17that could be seen
17:18by people in China.
17:22TikTok n'a donc pas rompu
17:24ses liens avec la Chine.
17:27Sa gouvernance reste dépendante
17:29de sa maison mère.
17:31Dès lors,
17:32la question cruciale qui se pose
17:34est celle de la destination
17:36des données générées
17:37par les utilisateurs américains.
17:39Des données directement liées
17:41à leur identité.
17:45A lot of people look at TikTok
17:47and they think
17:47it's just a fun application
17:50for sharing dance videos
17:51and other memes.
17:53But the reality is
17:54it operates
17:55as a very sophisticated
17:56surveillance technology.
17:58It pulls everything
18:00from search and browsing history,
18:02keystroke patterns,
18:03potentially biometrics.
18:05On a du mal
18:07à concevoir
18:08la quantité
18:09d'inférences
18:10qui sont possibles
18:11avec l'accumulation
18:12de ces données.
18:14Parce que lorsqu'on donne
18:15par exemple
18:16accès à ces contacts,
18:18on peut recréer
18:20des graphes sociaux,
18:21notamment.
18:22On peut savoir
18:22qui est ami avec qui,
18:23qui est en contact
18:24avec qui.
18:26Et ça,
18:26c'est notamment
18:27une donnée
18:27qui sont très sensible.
18:28Avec cette masse de données,
18:34il serait possible
18:35pour TikTok,
18:36ou en tout cas
18:36ceux qui tireraient
18:37les ficelles derrière
18:38ou qui en bénéficieraient,
18:39de se construire
18:40une image assez fidèle
18:42et à la fois assez précise
18:44de la population américaine,
18:45de certains segments
18:46de la population américaine
18:47ou de personnes
18:48qui occuperaient
18:49des postes sensibles.
18:52Donc on voit
18:53qu'en fait ici,
18:54TikTok apparaît bien
18:55comme un acteur
18:55type Huawei.
18:58Une espèce
18:59de cheval de troie
18:59piloté par le Parti communiste
19:01et donc,
19:02là où va la logique,
19:03suit les intérêts
19:05stratégiques
19:05du Parti communiste chinois.
19:09Monsieur le secrétaire,
19:10nous devons considérer
19:12maintenant,
19:13un ban
19:14sur les appels sociaux
19:15et les réseaux sociaux,
19:16surtout TikTok.
19:18Nous avons travaillé
19:18sur ce sujet
19:19depuis longtemps.
19:20Si c'était le problème
19:21de la technologie Huawei
19:23et de votre infrastructure,
19:24nous avons passé
19:25tout le monde
19:25et nous faisons
19:26un vrai progrès
19:26en tirant ça.
19:27Je ne veux pas
19:28en front du président
19:29mais c'est quelque chose
19:30qu'on est en train de regarder.
19:30Vous recommandez
19:31que les gens
19:32d'envoyent ça
19:32sur leurs phones
19:33ce soir,
19:34demain,
19:35à quel moment
19:35actuellement ?
19:37Si vous voulez
19:37votre information privée
19:38dans les mains
19:39du Parti communiste chinois.
19:39Pour l'administration Trump,
19:45la cause est entendue.
19:47La simple possibilité
19:48que le PCC ait accès
19:50aux données
19:51des utilisateurs américains
19:52de TikTok
19:53représente un risque
19:54suffisamment sérieux
19:55pour passer à l'action
19:57sans tarder.
19:57Début août 2020,
20:18Donald Trump détaille son plan.
20:19Si Biden ne cède pas TikTok
20:22et donc son algorithme
20:23si puissant
20:24à une entreprise américaine
20:25dans les 45 jours,
20:27l'application
20:28ne sera plus téléchargeable
20:29depuis les Etats-Unis.
20:31Tout simplement.
20:31Comment peut réagir
20:50le régime chinois
20:51alors qu'il revendique
20:53officiellement,
20:54tout du moins,
20:55que TikTok
20:55est une société indépendante
20:57de Biden,
20:58donc du Parti communiste ?
21:01Le 14 septembre 2020,
21:21Xi Jinping annonce sa décision.
21:24Elle est sans appel.
21:25Accepté la vente de TikTok,
21:27ce serait céder
21:28son précieux algoritme.
21:30Donc,
21:31porter atteinte
21:31à la sécurité du régime.
21:33Il n'en est pas question.
21:35TikTok ne sera pas vendu.
21:37Sous-titrage Société Radio-Canada
21:42But the US government, I was with them.
21:47They were very proud of themselves,
21:51very selfishly.
21:54They thought they were the god of the world,
21:57they were the people of the world.
21:59They were the people of the world,
22:01and they were the people of the world.
22:03This is the Chinese government to do the things.
22:05Some of the technologies can't be sold.
22:09Some of the technologies, including TikTok,
22:13are some of the technologies we don't want to export.
22:18So if there is any divestment of the company,
22:23under Chinese law,
22:25the algorithm cannot go with the app,
22:28which is essentially like having a Ferrari
22:32and taking the engine out of it.
22:35It's the algorithm of the recommendation of TikTok
22:38which is considered as a strategic asset,
22:42as a form of a jewel of the crown,
22:44and not, to properly speak,
22:46the commercial activities of TikTok
22:49through its global expansion.
22:54In taking such a decision,
22:56the Chinese regime recognizes for the first time
22:59that TikTok is well under Biden's authority,
23:02his mother-in-law,
23:03on which he decides to strengthen
23:04even a little bit more his emprise.
23:09The Chinese Communist Party
23:10has acquired 1% of the capital of Biden's capital,
23:14which, in normal,
23:15would not give him a way of preponderance.
23:17But there also,
23:18through the national security laws
23:20and the way the Chinese
23:21built its competition with the rest of the world,
23:24obviously,
23:25it means that, very clearly,
23:26the government of the party
23:27has their words to say.
23:30With this unique percentage,
23:32the party place
23:33one of its members
23:34at the administration's council,
23:36a certain Wu Chu-Gang,
23:38representing the CAC,
23:40the administration of the Chinese cyber space.
23:44A few months later,
23:46Zhang Yiming is,
23:47as a result,
23:48from the group
23:49which he created
23:50about 10 years ago
23:51and valued at 300 billion dollars.
23:54...
23:59The history of Biden,
24:00and so on TikTok,
24:02is currently written without him.
24:04And it's the PCC
24:05who becomes the main author.
24:07The president-elect
24:09of the United States of America,
24:11Joe Biden.
24:13of the united states of america joe biden
24:18dès son entrée en fonction début 2021 joe biden hérite de l'encombrant dossier tik tok
24:29que son prédécesseur a finalement renoncé à interdire
24:32il n'est pas simple en effet de supprimer un réseau social utilisé désormais par 150 millions
24:43d'américains surtout le nouveau président sait que l'affrontement systémique avec la chine gagnera
24:52en intensité il ne se fait aucune illusion sur la possibilité d'un rapprochement avec xi jinping
24:58il est très bright il est très tôt
25:03il n'est pas que c'est une critique juste une réalité il n'est pas un petit peu en sécurité
25:07il n'est pas un petit peu en sécurité
25:10et quand président biden en s'est parti
25:12il y a un choix entre le soutien que le président Trump a été
25:17ou en retour à l'opatma
25:18il y a ele a eu le choix de l'adresse
25:20qui je pense que c'est le droit à l'échec
25:23In fact, the government should not continue to maintain the trade war.
25:30It is even more far from the Trump government.
25:35From this point of view, the government didn't change the trade war.
25:43It is even more far from the Trump government.
25:49We all know that in the United States,
25:54the United States is in a complete attack.
25:57China is still in a complete attack.
26:01China has no desire for any other people.
26:07It is to be able to agree with the United States,
26:12and to be able to cooperate with the United States.
26:19See you tomorrow. Thank you.
26:21It is always that the United States is not fair to face China,
26:28and it has caused a lot of problems later.
26:31And the financial crisis is also affected by the British countries.
26:35In fact, this aggression of tensions between the two countries,
26:40TikTok is tied in the May 2021
26:44about an economic generation
26:46that is absolutely American- compatible.
26:48Hi everyone. It's Sho here.
26:50I'm the CEO of TikTok.
26:53He's called Chu Shudz. He's 39 years old.
27:23He has no Chinese background, speak fluent English, and can be very presentable to the Western politicians and investors. And Shou Chu is that person.
27:36Le nouveau dirigeant met alors en place le projet appelé Texas. Désormais, les données des utilisateurs américains ne seront plus stockées en Chine, mais aux Etats-Unis, dans des data centers administrés par la société américaine Oracle.
27:52Coût de l'opération, un milliard et demi de dollars.
28:22They appointed a Singapore-born executive. They moved the headquarters in the US to LA. They walled off American data in Oracle servers that are based in Texas, spending 1.5 billion dollars to do that. Those are all really big moves.
28:42Mais en juin 2022, une enquête de BuzzFeed, un média en ligne américain, vient percuter ce bel édifice.
28:52L'article fait état de 80 enregistrements de réunions internes au cours desquelles un des participants assure « la Chine voit tout ».
29:01Pire même, un ingénieur basé à Pékin, surnommé Master Admin, aurait lui aussi accès à tout.
29:08« Convoquée par le Sénat, Vanessa Papas, chef des opérations de TikTok, ses vertus apparaît aux attaques des élus américains. »
29:23Do you have any response to the BuzzFeed news story?
29:27Yes, those allegations were not found. There was talk of a master account, which does not exist at our company, period.
29:35You're telling me that China-based employees have never accessed non-public data of U.S. TikTok users?
29:42I'm saying that there is strict access controls around the data that is accessed in the United States, that is overseen by our U.S.-led security team.
29:52We are working with Oracle.
29:53That's not what this article says.
29:56We disagree with the categorization in that article wholeheartedly.
29:59A Washington, la defense de Vanessa Papas ne convainc pas.
30:08Beaucoup doutent de la fiabilité du projet Texas.
30:13Le lobbyiste Jacob Elberg aide cela.
30:17Début 2023, il passe à la vitesse supérieure.
30:21Il est temps d'abattre TikTok.
30:22L'opération démarre derrière les fenêtres de cette luxueuse bibliothèque de la capitale fédérale.
30:32Il est temps d'abattre.
30:33Il est temps d'abattre au Québec.
30:34Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the Hill and Valley Conference.
30:40I decided to launch the Hill and Valley Forum as an experiment to bring together tech CEOs and elected officials in one room to allow them to sit next to each other for an evening and talk about national security issues.
30:54specifically anchored around how do we deal with this looming threat that we're facing
31:00with the rise of the Chinese Communist Party and the hostilities waged by the Chinese Communist Party
31:06against our country.
31:09Simple coïncidence ou mélange assumé des genres, Jacob Helberg vient de rejoindre une commission du
31:16Sénat chargée de la sécurité des échanges entre la Chine et les États-Unis. Il est dans le même
31:22temps conseillé de Palantir Technologies, une société spécialisée dans le traitement des
31:28données et surtout très proche des milieux du renseignement. Avec cette double casquette,
31:35le lobbyiste va s'imposer comme le trait d'union entre le monde politique d'un côté et la Silicon
31:41Valley de l'autre.
31:42Toutes ces entreprises là se sont organisées dans un lobbying extrêmement puissant et leur message
31:48c'est de dire au fond il ne faut pas réguler les entreprises américaines parce que ce sont nos
31:52entreprises. Celles-ci joueraient habilement de la frontière de plus en plus poreuse entre on va
31:58dire sécurité économique et sécurité nationale, sachant que la sécurité économique c'est avant tout la
32:02leur, celle de leur investissement.
32:04La priorité des acteurs de la Silicon Valley, avoir accès aux données des internautes américains
32:14pour poursuivre leur croissance. Le gouvernement doit continuer de leur garantir l'existence d'un
32:20marché des data aussi libre que possible, sans contrainte.
32:23L'écosystème qui concerne la collecte des données à caractère personnel aux États-Unis, c'est un écosystème
32:30qui est extrêmement complexe, qui repose sur une régulation qui est minimale et ces données
32:35sont notamment monétisées par un ensemble d'acteurs qu'on appelle des courtiers en données,
32:39un data brokers.
32:40Il y a des data brokers qui peuvent prendre le data et vendre leurs données à qui
32:50veulent vendre leurs données à qui veulent acheter.
32:51Il y a des gens qui payent pour les données, peut utiliser ces données et ils vendre leurs données
32:57à qui. Et c'est un part de la data qui devient plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus, plus.
33:02A lot of companies collect a lot of data about people because their entire business model
33:14is what we call surveillance capitalism.
33:18The idea is that they will gather all of this information about their users and then they
33:25will sell it.
33:27This made Facebook a lot of money, it made Google a lot of money, it made sort of what
33:33we think of as big tech, rich.
33:35Pour continuer de s'enrichir, la Silicon Valley ne veut surtout pas qu'une partie des données
33:43soient captées par un acteur étranger, comme TikTok.
33:46Il faut donc l'exclure du système.
33:48Cet intérêt, purement commercial, rejoint la hantise sécuritaire de Washington et de ses services de renseignement.
33:58Eux aussi ont un besoin vital d'accéder aux données des Américains.
34:03Depuis le 11 septembre, une partie de ces data brokers vendent ces données par des arrangements souvent opaques
34:11aux agences qui composent le secteur de sécurité nationale aux Etats-Unis et pas simplement à des fins publicitaires.
34:18...
34:27...
34:34...
34:38...
34:39...
34:41We are carrying tracking devices around in our pockets.
34:53It's pretty clear that large tech platforms, you know,
34:55have to work with the federal government,
34:57and particularly the National Security Administration,
34:59to hand over information when demanded.
35:03Much as we expect is the case in China as well.
35:06I think every intelligence service has a common DNA
35:11of what they're trying to do is to get useful intelligence
35:13and useful information for their governments.
35:16I think the difference between the Western and the Chinese approaches
35:19is that typically we have more law-based and personal freedoms
35:23and other restraints on what can and cannot be done in Western societies.
35:28TikTok is attached to an authoritarian regime.
35:34That's the major difference.
35:36The Americans have never had any problems
35:39with the capture of data by American companies
35:42or Western companies, let's say.
35:45What caused a shock within the American political system
35:49is that it's a Chinese society,
35:52a strategic rival of the United States,
35:55who has access to data from users.
35:57On this vote, the yeas are 352, the nays are 65.
36:23The bill is passed.
36:24And without the objection, the motion to reconsider
36:27is laid on the table.
36:32Bidens doit céder TikTok US à une entreprise non-chinoise
36:36d'ici janvier 2025.
36:38Sinon, l'application sera interdite sur le sol américain.
36:41Mais Donald Trump, réélu à la présidence, fait volte-face.
36:53Tic-Tac, because we're talking about a tremendous...
36:55Who in this audience goes with TikTok?
36:58Many?
36:59Yeah.
37:00Very popular.
37:02Yeah.
37:03De retour à la Maison-Blanche,
37:06l'homme d'affaires suspend l'interdiction de l'application
37:09en attendant de trouver une autre solution.
37:12Mais quel que soit le sort de l'application chinoise aux États-Unis,
37:19une tragédie, survenue un an plus tôt,
37:22a révélé une rupture profonde dans l'usage de Tik-Tac,
37:26TikTok, like other social networks.
37:35Since the 7th October 2023,
37:38some states serve to continue political objectives.
37:42Nothing will never be like before.
37:56In December 2023, an article from Wall Street Journal
38:01revealed that on 4.800 videos of TikTok on the conflict,
38:0559% of them are pro-Palestinian
38:08and only 15% are looking forward to Israel.
38:13The main accusation made by the US legislators,
38:18especially in the Republican camp, but relatively bipartisan,
38:21is that since the 7th October,
38:23TikTok would be considered, or in any case,
38:26would be considered to put forward
38:28some pro-Palestinian content,
38:30in any case, at least compared to other platforms.
38:38There is a dimension of the vector influence.
38:42TikTok serves as a platform to push the issues.
38:45It can be true,
38:47it's not necessarily a manipulation of information,
38:49it's not necessarily a disinformation,
38:52it can be true information,
38:53but that China wants to put forward.
38:58In using TikTok,
38:59Pékin takes directly to the United States,
39:02the best support of Israel on the international scene,
39:05and, in other words,
39:07it takes advantage of the repression
39:09that it takes to the Muslim minority of the Uyghurs.
39:12The Muslim people will not be faced by evil,
39:15調理 and killing.
39:16The death of the Uyghurs,
39:17the killing and killing,
39:18are hundreds of thousands of Muslims per capita.
39:21Each of the Muslims should not be able to
39:22put in the politics of the people's rights.
39:25They will not be able to do documents of the people's rights.
39:27These are the rules of the 21st century,
39:31of the 21st century, are becoming hybrid wars,
39:34in which the information information is very central,
39:37and that today, the war is also a war of opinion,
39:41and that this war of opinion is played on social networks.
40:01Or vice versa, depending on which side you're at.
40:04We are moving in right now.
40:05There are dead bodies everywhere.
40:09What is this philosophy?
40:10From a certain meaning, the most simple thing is
40:13to strengthen your values to others.
40:18This is what the Western countries are doing.
40:23The United States are doing this.
40:26From Pekin's perspective,
40:28most of the social networks are American,
40:30they impose a treatment of the actuality
40:32that is necessarily aligned with Washington's interests.
40:35TikTok allows us to break this dominant model.
40:40What is this?
40:42What is this?
40:43What is this?
40:44What is this world?
40:46What is this world?
40:48What is this world?
40:49We are all the citizens of Kazakhstan!
40:51We know that this time,
40:53we know that if no TikTok,
40:56what is this world?
40:58what Americans don't know.
41:00When I go on social media
41:01and I see a bunch of dead bodies
41:02of innocent women and children and men,
41:04I don't want to see that anymore.
41:06But after TikTok,
41:08some facts of the real truth
41:10were spread out to the US,
41:11it caused a lot of attacks on the US,
41:13and the most of the attacks on the US.
41:16We are all the people!
41:18We are all the people!
41:20We are all the people!
41:22We are all the people!
41:24We are all the people!
41:25We are all the people!
41:26I am aware that we see them from the US,
41:27we are all the people!
41:28I see them!
41:29We are all the people!
41:30They also are all the Romans,
41:31the South Amber,
41:32and members of the North.
41:34We are all the votes!
41:35And I see them from certain things!
41:36It's true.
41:37The events of the 8 years of interest
41:38has formederna in the world
41:39and goes on TikTok.
41:40If China comes to divulge the story that she is a powerful power,
41:50with which all countries have intérêt to cooperate,
41:53because she offers winning-winning relations,
41:56and that, in other words, the occidentists offer relations
42:00that are built on a form of neo-colonialism,
42:04then she has everything.
42:06If the social networks like TikTok serve now
42:11to the informal war,
42:13the personal data of these users
42:15are also directly used on the battlefield.
42:23In April 2024,
42:25the online online online magazine israeli Plus 972
42:29is the first time
42:31the use of the Israeli army
42:34in Gaza
42:35with a artificial intelligence technology
42:37called Lavender,
42:39and this,
42:40since the 7th of October.
42:44The author of this incredible revelation,
42:46the Israeli journalist,
42:48Yuval Abraham.
42:50He was designed by the military.
42:54His purpose was, when it was being designed,
42:57to mark the low-ranking operatives
43:01in the Hamas and Islamic Jihad military wings.
43:04What Lavender does,
43:05is it scans information
43:08on probably 90% of the population of Gaza.
43:12So we're talking about, you know,
43:13more than a million people.
43:15We have a large-scale surveillance
43:19of the Palestinian population
43:21by the Israeli army,
43:22which goes through video surveillance
43:23which has been deployed
43:24everywhere,
43:25both in the Jordanian and in Gaza.
43:28Also by a surveillance
43:29of access to Internet
43:30and also by access to data
43:32provided by WhatsApp
43:34and other American tech actors.
43:38And in addition to that,
43:40the Israeli army
43:41has a very developed cyber defense
43:43with especially companies
43:45who are distinguished
43:46by their capabilities
43:47of hacking.
43:50In aggregating all of these data,
43:53Lavender identifies
43:54the number effarant
43:55of 37.000 members of the Hamas.
44:0337.000 people
44:04to eliminated their homes.
44:07Because according to a military source,
44:09it's much easier
44:10to bombard a family home.
44:14And with an immediate commitment
44:15in order to make rules.
44:17For a simple soldier,
44:19Zahal autorizes
44:20up to 20 victims collateral.
44:22For a superior officer,
44:24this ratio can be elevated
44:25to 100.
44:26100 innocents killed
44:28to eliminate a single enemy.
44:30The military knew that approximately
44:3510% of the people
44:37that the machine was marking
44:39to be killed
44:40were not Hamas militants.
44:41Some of them had a loose connection
44:43to Hamas.
44:44Others had completely no connection
44:46to Hamas.
44:47We are in a international
44:52zone of non-right
44:53which is very inquiet.
44:57It's not because
44:58an algorithm
44:59will declare
45:00a target
45:01as a member of Hamas
45:02that it can be
45:03enough robust
45:05to justify
45:06this kind of act.
45:0710% of errors
45:11on 37.000 victims
45:13are potentially
45:143.700 people
45:15killed
45:16by error.
45:17Without counting
45:18the families
45:19due to
45:20the victims
45:21collateral
45:22and the destruction
45:23of their houses
45:24and other civil infrastructure
45:25civil.
45:30I think that
45:31the Israeli army
45:32using artificial intelligence
45:33to justify
45:34threats
45:35against
45:36a potentially international
45:39threat
45:40from the development
45:41of this type
45:42of technology.
45:45I think that
45:46a system
45:47similar to that
45:48is
45:49that every country
45:50either already has it
45:51or will have it.
45:52I think it's just
45:53it's a matter of time
45:54if they don't already have it
45:55or have not been researching it.
45:56I'm just guessing
45:57that the Israelis
45:58just got out at first.
46:02There is an avant
46:03and an après
46:04this October
46:05of the use of personal data
46:07and the social networks
46:08are now part of
46:10the tools of
46:11projection
46:12of power
46:13that the state
46:14and the tech
46:15have been
46:16embarked
46:17in a
46:18scary race
46:19on
46:20face
46:22face
46:23to an illusion
46:24of power
46:25brought
46:26by this process
46:27called the datafication
46:28of the world
46:29and the fact
46:30to put the world
46:31in order
46:32through a sufficient volume
46:34of data
46:35and how does
46:36a nation
46:37view this
46:38in its future.
46:40We have laws of land
46:41warfare
46:42and I would offer
46:43that the reason
46:44that we have those
46:45is to protect ourselves
46:46from ourselves
46:47and our own excesses
46:48because once the genie
46:50gets out of the bottle
46:51it can affect everybody.
46:52The bad genie is already out of its lamp
46:58thanks to the data
47:00the states
47:01lead
47:02to influence
47:03and manipulation
47:04even
47:05to
47:06better
47:07destroy the population
47:08and even
47:09sometimes
47:10destroy
47:11while others
47:13do not hesitate
47:14to face the
47:15law
47:16to make
47:17the security
47:18requirements
47:19to protect
47:20the most
47:21fragile
47:22and the defense
47:23of the fundamental liberties
47:25TikTok
47:26as an application
47:28the most
47:29téléchargeable
47:30of the planet
47:31acts as the best
47:32revelator
47:33and amplificator
47:34of its contemporary disorders
47:37which could lead
47:39to chaos
47:40if no
47:41standard regulations
47:42would not be able
47:43to control
47:44and control
47:45the uses
47:46of these
47:47digital environments
47:48and civil
47:49and military
48:02Do you have TikTok
48:03on your phone?
48:04No, I don't know.
48:05Not a good use of my time.
48:07I do not have TikTok
48:08on my phone.
48:09We're a TikTok free household.
48:11I have TikTok
48:12the app on my phone.
48:13But do I
48:14regularly
48:15like swipe
48:16through my
48:17my TikTok?
48:18No.
48:19Well, I mean
48:20it's something
48:21that I research
48:22so I have it
48:23on a burner phone.
48:24I don't have a phone.
48:25I don't have a TikTok
48:26on my phone.
48:27I don't have a TikTok
48:28on my phone.
48:29I don't have a TikTok
48:31on my phone.
48:32There's a lot of
48:33very sensitive information
48:34on my devices
48:35and so I don't have TikTok
48:36on my phone.
48:37I don't have a TikTok
48:38on my phone.
48:39I don't have a TikTok
48:40on my phone.
48:41I don't have a TikTok
48:42on my phone.
48:43I don't have a TikTok
48:44on my phone.
48:45I don't have a TikTok
48:46on my phone.
48:47I don't have a TikTok
48:48on my phone.